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The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978:
Four Years of Practice and
Two Years to Make Perfect
By RICHARD GREER MORGAN* AND MARTHA PRIDDY PATTERSON* *
INTRODUCTION

The natural gas industry has been subject to direct or indirect
regulation since 1938, but the passage of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 (NGPA) I has precipitated more confusion, disagree- '
ment and uncertainty than existed during the forty years prior to
its passage. In effect for only four years, the NGPA contains provisions which will release price controls on forty to sixty percent
of all natural gas produced in the United States by 1986. Further,
the NGPA's deregulation provisions have caused, and will continue to cause, substantial problems and heated debate.
Three potential problems with the NGPA are apparent to
those active in the area of natural gas regulation. First, because
the NGPA price controls embrace all natural gas, including intrastate natural gas, a substantial disparity may arise between interstate pipelines and intrastate purchasers in acquiring additional gas supplies. This results primarily because most interstate
pipelines purchase a comparatively large volume of so-called
"old" gas which, under the NGPA, remains priced at the lower
rates established by previous regulation under the Natural Gas
Act (NGA). 2 When interstate pipelines purchase more costly
newer gas, they average that cost with the old gas cost, allowing
the interstate pipeline to sell its gas at prices lower than the cost

Partner in the Washington, D.C., firm of O'Connor & Hannan; Attorney/Advisor
to Federal Power Commissioner Lawrence J. O'Connor. A.B. 1966, Princeton University;
J.D. 1969, University of Texas School of Law.
"" Director of Forest ProductslTaxation Policy in the Washington, D.C., company
of Time Incorporated. M.C. B.A. 1971, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1974, University of
Texas School of Law.
1 Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
2 Natural Gas Act §§ 1-24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1976 and Supp. 111978) [hereinafter cited as NGA].
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of new gas. Intrastate pipelines generally have little, if any, old
gas and must, therefore, buy higher priced gas. Certain intrastate pipelines have had difficulty acquiring gas. Even if it can be
acquired, these pipelines have difficulty selling to their customers
because their weighted average price of gas at times has exceeded
the price of alternate fuels.
A second problem envisioned, when and if natural gas price
controls terminate in whole or in part, is the so-called "price
spike" or "fly-up." The theory behind this perceived problem is
that most gas purchase contracts contain some type of price escalation clause which is triggered by a rise in the price of other gas
which is sold after decontrolled gas is no longer subject to price
control.3 In other words, virtually all natural gas prices will,
once deregulated, escalate to the highest price paid for any deregulated gas. This would, of course, exacerbate the existing disparity in the relative abilities of interstate pipelines and intrastate purchasers to acquire new gas supplies. Numerous arguments support the need for such escalator clauses to protect producers, but other arguments support the need for a uniform price
cap on such escalators.
The third problem perceived under partial or complete deregulation is market ordering. This problem involves both the
ability of pipelines to avoid the loss of industrial customers if the
price of gas exceeds the price of alternative fuels and the relative
intrastate purchasers to comabilities of interstate pipelines and
4
pete for additional gas supplies.

3 CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE AND THE NATL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTrrrE, 97TH
2d SESS., NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY 143-44, (Comm. Print 97-GG 1982)
[hereinafter cited as NATURAL GA REGULATION STUDY]. The study relies upon two anCONG.,

alyses of a statistically valid sample of 20,000 natural gas contracts on file at the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The contracts are for old gas or rollovers of contracts which have expired but have been reexecuted; nonetheless, the contracts represent
70 % of the total gas supply. About 90 % of the contracts contain an area rate clause price
escalator; between 61.6% and 72.4% of the contracts also contain a renegotiation price
clause which ties the price of the gas to the average price paid for gas of the same quality in
the same area as demonstrated in one to three contracts provided by the producer to the
pipeline or to the price of certain alternate fuels.
4 R. Means, Analysis of the Bidding Disparity Between Interstate and Intrastate
Pipelines (April 2, 1982) (unpublished working draft) and Texas Energy and Natural Resources Advisory Council, Impact of the NGPA on Current and Projected Material
Markets: Comment Pursuant to the Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 82-26-000 (Aug. 1982).
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These problems as well as regulatory problems faced by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commisson (FERC)5 stem primarily
from the NGPA. However, the entire history of natural gas regulation suggests that many of the same issues would be encountered today even without the NGPA. By artificially depressing
the price of natural gas through legislation and regulation, consumers have been encouraged to increase natural gas consumption while being denied any concept of the true value of the commodity. As a result, they are ill-prepared to face total energy
reality.
This Article reviews the history of natural gas regulation
prior to enactment of the NGPA, the specifics of the NGPA, the
attempts of the FERC to implement the NGPA and the current
administrative and congressional approaches to regulation. The
future of natural gas regulation cannot be reasonably predicted.
The very difficulty and anxiety surrounding the adoption of the
NGPA illustrates the conflicting and competing constituencies,
interests and policies involved in natural gas regulation and militates against such predictions. However, observations will be
made whenever possible.
I.
A.

BRIEF HISTORY OF NATURAL GAS PRICING

Origins of Wellhead Price Regulation-the Natural Gas
Act and the Phillips Case

Conflicts between interstate and intrastate natural gas markets are not new. Indeed, the incentive for the first federal legislation regulating natural gas was the regulatory gap caused by
the states' inability to regulate the price of natural gas entering
interstate commerce and the states' attempts to regulate the price
of gas delivered from other states. The United States Supreme
Court consistently held state attempts to regulate natural gas

5 FERC, the successor agency to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), was
created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 204,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7134 (Supp. 1982). Throughout this Article, the FPC will be used to
describe the agency prior to 1977; FERC will be used to describe the agency interchangably both before and after this date. Commission will be used to describe either.
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which crossed state lines to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 6
After reviewing the problems of gas regulation, focusing primarily upon natural gas transportation costs which often greatly
exceeded the actual cost of the gas involved, Congress enacted
the NGA. 7 The Act applied to the transportation and sale for
resale of natural gas in interstate commerce but specifically
exempted "the production or gathering of natural gas." 8 The bill
defined "natural gas companies" as "a person engaged in the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale
in interstate commerce of such gas for resale." Administration of
the Act lodged with the Federal Power Commission (FPC),
which was granted broad authority to establish "just and reasonable rates" for interstate transportation and interstate sales for
resale of natural gas. It also was authorized to grant certificates
of public convenience and necessity for the sale and transportation of natural gas, construction of pipelines in interstate commerce and abandonment of service.
The FPC did not interpret its authority as extending to establishing wellhead prices for natural gas sales to interstate pipelines
by an independent producer, e.g., producers not affiliated with
interstate pipelines. The FPC did interpret its authority as allowing regulation of natural gas produced by a pipeline over which
the FPC exercised regulatory authority,10 even if such sales occurred within a single state." The Supreme Court rejected the
FPC's narrow view of its own powers and interpreted FPC's
* jurisdiction over natural gas producers as extending beyond that

6 State Corporation Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 563-64 (1933);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam and Elec., 273 U.S. 83, 86-89 (1927) (applying
the principles of Kansas Natural Gas to a state's attempt to regulate interstate electrical
rates); Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 306-10 (1923).
7 See Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title 1, 59 TEx. L.
Rlv. 101, 106-07 (1980).
8 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
9 Id. § 717a(6) (1976).
10 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 600-04 (1945) (holding that
the FPC could include gas well and gathering facilities in determining an interstate gas
company's rate base, thereby indirectly regulating the wellhead price).
11 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 689-93 (1947).
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previously exercised by FPC. In the landmark case of PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,'12 the Supreme Court overturned the
FPC's determination that Phillips Petroleum, an independent gas
producer which produced and gathered natural gas but which
did not engage in interstate transportation of the natural gas,
was not a natural gas company within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act and thus not subject to the FPC's direct pricing
authority. In so holding, the Court relied upon "the statutory
language, the pertinent legislative history and the past decisions
of this Court."' 3 The Court rejected the argument that Congress
intended to regulate only interstate pipeline companies, stating
that "if such were the case we have difficulty in perceiving why
the commission's jurisdiction over the transportation or sale for
resale in interstate commerce of natural gas is granted in the disjunctive.""4
In evaluating the FPC's history of producer regulation, it is
valuable to note that neither the NGA nor the Phillips decision
provided guidance as to the methodology to be used by the Commission in setting producer prices.' 5 Certainly, gas producers did
not fit the concept of traditional utility regulation employed
'under the NGA to establish rates for pipelines. Nonetheless, the
FPC did not attempt to construct a new pricing structure to fit
gas producers. Rather, being familiar with such utility regulation, the FPC attempted to apply that same regulatory pricing
methodology to producers. The FPC began setting cost-based
rates for the more than 8,000 individual producers just as it did
for the far less numerous interstate pipeline transportation companies. As might be expected, the FPC immediately fell behind
in its task. This attempt to set individual rates at a just and
reasonable level based upon each producer's cost of service was

12 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
13 Id. at 677.

,4Id. at 681.
15
The Court's allegations of congressional intent regarding the NGA's coverage of
wellhead pricing is weak, to say the least. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747, 755-56 (1968), the Court ultimately admitted the NGA's provisions "do not specifically extend to producers or to wellhead sales of natural gas," noting rather that the Act specifically excludes production and gathering of natural gas.
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not only inaccurate, but impossible to administer.
Recognizing the futility of individual cost-based rates, the
FPC searched for more realistic methods to implement its regulatory authority. Initially, the FTC turned to "in-line" prices to
speed the regulatory process.' 6 This method employed categorical producer price ceilings for states and certain areas. If producers filed contracts for sales of gas at or below these ceilings,
the Commission accepted the contracts. As time passed, the inline concept grew in popularity at the Commission and became
the embryonic model for the first area-wide price determination.
In 1960, the FPC proposed setting rates on an average cost
basis for a given area, the so-called area rate method.' 7 It was not
until 1965, eleven years after the FTC first began regulating the
sales price of natural gas for resale that the Commission formally
adopted this new pricing method.' The area rate methodology
designated various geographical areas with relatively homogenous producing characteristics such as the Permian Basin, South
Louisiana and the Rocky Mountains. Exploration and development costs in that area, including the cost for unsuccessful drilling, were averaged and combined with a predetermined rate of
return to establish rates for the area.
Using composite cost data from the area involved, the Commission established a vintage pricing system whereby gas produced from wells dedicated to interstate commerce after January
1, 1961, received a higher, incentive oriented price and all older
gas received a lower price. The Commission also established a
minimum just and reasonable rate for all gas sold in the area,
finding that existing contracts which included a rate below the
minimum were contrary to the public interest. 19 These rates were
immediately challenged in court. The Supreme Court in Permian

16 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 18 C.F.R. § 2.56.24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).

17 Area Rate Proceeding No. AR 61-1,24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
18 Area Rate Proceeding No. AR 61-1,34 F.P.C. 159 and 1068 (1965).
19 Interestingly, while the parties challenged many aspects of the FPC calculations

on area rates, apparently they did not challenge the FPC's authority to abrogate contracts
by setting a minimum rate. The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) dis-

cusses the relationship of contracts and regulation with regard to the application of indefinite price escalation clauses, but makes no mention of minimum rates. See Id. at 784.
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Basin Area Rate Caseso upheld the concept of area rates and vintaging established by the FTC.
The Commission conducted similar exhaustive analyses for
each designated area. 21 In each decision, the Commission specifically created price vintaging on the theory that higher prices for
new wells provided an incentive for producers, whereas lower
prices were appropriate for gas produced from wells where the
producer had already made an investment. The Commission also
set a minimum price for all sales of natural gas.
The Commission's decisions in the Appalachian-Illinois
Basinz rate cases and in Southern LouisianaI12 altered the use of
price vintaging. In both decisions, the Commission announced
the need to raise old gas prices to generate greater cash flow and
stimulate future exploration and development. Even more important, in the former decision the Commission announced its intention to eliminate gradually all price vintaging.24 Despite this
policy statement, the Commission returned to the vintaging concept in later producer rate cases.
From area rates the FPC moved to the establishment of national rates, still basing these rates in the first instance upon the
evaluation of several cost components. 5 The Commission chose

20Id. at 747.
21 See Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, 40 F.P.C. 530, modified, 41
F.P.C. 301 (1968), alf'd, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). New
rates for this area were established in Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, 46
F.P.C. 86, clarified 46 F.P.C. 633, (1971), affd sub nom. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483,,
F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub noma. Mobile Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974);
Texas Gulf Coast Area Rate Proceeding, 45 F.P.C. 674, modified 46 F.P.C. 827 (1971),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Public Service Commission v. FTC, 487 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), vacated and remandedsub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. Public Service Commission,
417 U.S. 964 (1974); Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Proceeding, 44 F.P.C. 761 (1970),
affd, Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972); Other Southwest
Area Rate Proceeding, 46 F.P.C. 900, modified 47 F.P.C. 99, (1971), affd, Other Southwest Area Rate Case (OSWA I), 484 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 973
(1974).
2 Rates for the Appalachian and Illinois Basin Areas, 48 F.P.C. 1299 (1972), af-fd
sub nom., Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974).
2 46 F.P.C. 86 (1971).
24 Rates for the Appalachian and Illinois Basin Areas, 48 F.P.C. at 1309.
2 Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212
(1974); 52 F.P.C. 263 (1974); 52 F.P.C. 700 (1974); 52 F.P.C. 1226 (1974); 52 F.P.C.
1605 (1974); 52 F.P.C. 35 (1975).
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not to eliminate price vintaging. The Court affirmed this methodology in Shell Oil Company v. FPC.2 The second national
area rate rulemaking27 also was challenged and upheld in American Public Gas Association v. FPC.2 In that case, the Commission employed not only recent exploration and development
costs, but also took into account the declining discovery rate for
new gas reserves. Most significantly, the Commission determined
the value of the incentive prices it set on the basis of a discounted
cash flow. As a result, gas prices doubled from those established
in the first national rate case.
This history of wellhead price regulation reveals several significant facts: 1) even without the NGPA, there would be a disparity between the price of old and new gas; 2) the Commission
has never implemented prices for wellhead sales of natural gas
which reflect the commodity or actual value of the gas in a timely fashion, and 3) if the method used by the Commission in the
second national rate case was used currently to set prices, rather
than the NGPA price system, wellhead prices of all natural gas
would be higher. Indeed, absent the legislative constraints on gas
consumption by industrial consumers, the market ordering
mechanisms might have already come into play. Those mechanisms might well have alleviated through market conditions the
problems perceived in natural gas deregulation.
B.

Shortages and Curtailments

By the early 1970s, serious natural gas shortages were occurring in the interstate market.29 At the same time, the intrastate
market, unregulated by the FPC, was enjoying for the most part
adequate, if not bountiful, supplies of natural gas. However, the
price for that gas far exceeded that of regulated interstate gas.
The FPC had established elaborate curtailment procedures.
It first issued Order No. 431 directing interstate pipelines to re26 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied'sub nom. California Co. v. FPC, 426
U.S. 940 (1976).
27 National Rates for Jurisdictional Sales of Natural Gas, 56 F.P.C. 509, 516-17
(1976), modified 56 F.P.C. 2698 (1976).
28 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978).
29 See Order No. 402,43 F.P.C. 707 (1970).
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port on curtailments. 30 FPC v. LouisianaPower and Light 1 upheld the Commission's broad authority to regulate curtailments.
However, as shortages continued, the FTC of necessity established curtailment priorities to allocate the scarce gas on a uniform basis among a single pipeline's purchasers. 32 The priorities
basically placed residential users first and industrial boiler fuel
users last., The Commission was generally considered not to
have the authority to allocate natural gas among interstate pipelines or between intrastate and interstate pipelines. Believing low
gas prices in the interstate market partly caused the shortages,
the Commission took several regulatory measures designed to encourage producers to explore for and dedicate gas to the interstate market.4 Apparently, these measures had little impact
upon the reserves of gas dedicated to the interstate market. The
shortages worsened.
Meanwhile, Congress struggled with deregulating natural
gas pricing as a partial solution to the curtailment problem; however, the volatile nature of the politics involved made it impossible to act upon the question. 3 Congress did at least take stopgap measures on the curtailment problem by enacting the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977. 31 The Act gave the President
authority to allocate natural gas supplies upon the declaration of
a "natural gas emergency." The Act also permitted "emergency
purchases" by interstate pipelines and local distribution companies directly from producers or from intrastate pipelines with-

30

45 F.P.C. 570 (1971).

31 406 U.S. 621 (1972).

Order No. 467,49 F.P.C. 85 (1973).
This treatment of gas boiler fuel users was further continued by the prohibition of
the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8371 (Supp. IV 1980),
against boiler fuel use, and by the NGPA Title I provisions on incremental pricing.
34 For a brief but excellent history of these programs, see Nordhaus, Producer Regulationand the NaturalGasPolicyAct of1978, 19 NAT. RESOuRCES J. 829, 837-40 (1979).
35 S. 2310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONC. REc. 33,655 (1975) passed the Senate in
1975; S. 3422, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 14,545 (1976), was reported from the
Senate Commerce Committee, May 19, 1976, but never brought to the Senate floor; and
H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONC. REc. 2657 (1976), was passed by the House on
February 5, 1976. No further action was taken on any deregulation bill during the 94th
Congress.
36 Pub. L. No. 95-2, §§ 1-14,91 Stat. 4 (1977).
32
3
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out jurisdictional consequences under the NGA. The allocation
provisions of this Act were never used; however, a number of
emergency sales were made pursuant to the Act. Distribution
companies, interstate pipelines and intrastate pipelines cooperated with each other to alleviate shortages wherever possible.
Whether the high degree of cooperation reflected genuine marketplace order or fear of additional regulation is unknown.
The Creationof the NGPA

C.

In large part, the seriousness of the curtailment spurred the
President and Congress to act. In April of 1977, President Carter
submitted to Congress a proposed National Energy Act, which
included concepts later enacted in the NGPA, the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act. This plan would have eliminated the inter/intrastate
distinction by pricing all new gas at a per Btu price equivalent to
the average refiner acquisition cost of crude oil. The plan also included new pricing rules for old gas.
Introduction of this plan set off political wrangling the likes
of which have rarely occurred over any piece of legislation.
Without an appreciation of the intense debates and political confrontations surrounding the adoption of the NGPA, it is impossible to understand the complexity of that Act.
The natural gas proposals of the President's national energy
plan were examined and reported in the House of Representatives by both the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
and an Ad Hoc Energy Committee set up by the House leadership to review the President's energy plan.3 7 The House reported
the President's bill basically intact; attempts at the committee
level to deregulate natural gas were turned back.- The fight in
the House would have become more pitched if the strategy of the
deregulation proponents had not been to save their energies for a

37 H.R. 8444, Part 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).

38 H.R. REP. No. 496, Part 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 98-101, reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8454,8539, 8542-45.
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stronger fight in the Senate which, as expected, had more deregulation proponents.
In June of 1977, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources began consideration of the President's bill and of
another deregulation bill called the Pearson-Bentsen Bill. The
Energy Committee, in an unusual move, reported the President's
bill without the traditional recommendation that it be adopted.
Then began a Senate floor fight which became legendary for its
vituperativeness, its myriad amendments, its all night sessions
and an ultimate resolution through byzantine parliamentary
maneuvers. These efforts resulted in adoption of an amended
Pearson-Bentsen provision allowing phased deregulation of new
9
gas prices and limiting controls only to the interstate market.
The House and Senate conferees arrived at the conference
with totally different gas regulation bills. In short, the House bill
extended regulation to the intrastate market but raised gas
prices, while the Senate gradually deregulated new gas. The interminable conference meetings between the House and Senate
conferees made the unusual parliamentary moves and fevered
battles in the separate houses seem like calm, rational debate.
The bill was in conference from the fall of 1977, until October of
1978, an unprecedented amount of time for a piece of regulatory
legislation.
The conferees frequently met with the President, the Secretary of the Department of Energy and the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to discuss political compromises and the practical application of various proposals. After
nearly a year of deliberations, on October 10, 1978, the staff released the conference report, 40 which was approved by the Senate in principle on September 27, 1978, and by the House on
October 15, 1978. On November 9, 1978, the President signed
the bill into law.
The intricacy of the resulting NGPA is almost unprecedented
in regulatory legislation. The conflicting needs and desires of
constituents, coupled with the crisis in energy supplies in general
and natural gas supplies to the interstate market in particular,
39 S. 2104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. S. REP. No. 436, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
40 S. REP. No. 1126, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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could have resulted in nothing less. The labyrinth of the NGPA
accurately reflects the maze of policies and concerns which Congress attempted to implement and address. The more complex
the policies to be implemented, the more complex is the legislation needed. The NGPA reflects this basic principle. Those seeking to change the NGPA provisions must recognize the history of
the legislation's development.
II.

A.

PRICING PROVISIONS OF THE NGPA AND
THEIR SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION

In General

The NGPA represents a relatively new and very complex system of regulation for the natural gas industry. Theoretically,
Title I raised prices for producers and Title II, incremental pricing, attempted to moderate those prices for residential customers. Neither theory proved realistic as time passed because gas
prices were tied to the price of crude oil at the time of enactment,
a mere seventeen dollars per barrel. Indeed, the incremental
pricing concept may have worked against residential customers
by forcing large industrial consumers, who bear a disproportionate amount of fixed costs, out of the market.
The NGPA eliminates a large portion of FERC's price setting
discretion with the statutory provisions setting more value-based
gas prices. The NGPA also brings previously unregulated intrastate gas under federal regulation and establishes a long-range
schedule for partial deregulation of certain gas sales.
NGPA section 101 establishes a mechanism for determining
the annual inflation adjustment factor applicable to certain
NGPA ceiling price categories and sets forth key definitions and
rules of general applicability. On a quarterly basis, FERC calculates and publishes the effective ceiling prices. States may estab41
lish first sale prices lower than those that NGPA provides.
Section 101(b)(9) provides that contract prices prevail when
they are lower than NGPA maximum lawful prices. This section

41 Natural Gas Policy Act § 602(a), 15 U.S.C. § 3432 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter
cited as NGPA].
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partially codifies judicial precedent known as the Mobile-SierraMemphis doctrine. 42 That doctrine established under the NGA
the primacy of private contract terms in the Commission's application of regulatory provisions. Accordingly, federal statutes and
regulations that govern the natural gas industry ostensibly do not
abrogate contract terms; 4 parties are free to agree to any contract terms not contrary to applicable regulations.
While many NGPA provisions and the Commission's regulations implementing the NGPA are being challenged in the courts,
the NGPA has withstood the challenge to its constitutionality
made in Oklahoma v. FERC.44 Plaintiffs, the states of Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana, sued for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the NGPA was unconstitutional. The states claimed:
1) the commerce clause did not authorize Congress to establish
maximum prices for intrastate gas; 2) even if such action were
valid under the commerce clause, the NGPA violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, which prohibited the federal government from usurping traditional state functions; 3) the
NGPA violated the tenth amendment by coercing states to enact
legislation and expend funds to implement a federal regulatory
program, and 4) allocation and distribution of intrastate gas into
interstate pipelines exceeded Congress's authority under the commerce clause and violated the states' sovereign immunity under
the tenth amendment, the equal protection clause and the due
process clause.
The district court awarded summary judgment to FERC and
upheld the constitutionality of the NGPA. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding on each
count. The court limited its determination based upon the commerce clause issue to two factors: whether Congress had a rational basis for determining that the pre-NGPA unregulated market

42

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103,
109-15 (1958); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1956); United Gas
Pipe Line
Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332,338-43 (1956).
43
But see NCA § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. S 717d(a) (1976); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. at 784.
44 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), affg 494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 102 S. Ct. 2902, 2903 (1982).
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of intrastate gas burdened interstate commerce; and, if so,
whether the means adopted by Congress were reasonably suited
to the task of eliminating this burden. The court found that a rational basis did exist for determining that the intrastate gas
market affected interstate commerce and the regulatory scheme
was a reasonable means to eliminate the burden thus imposed.
To determine whether the NGPA violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and state sovereignty, the court relied
upon National League of Cities v. Usery,45 which requires a determination of whether Congress has usurped the power of a
state to perform essential governmental functions. The court
concluded that the power to regulate gas produced and sold intrastate is not the type of traditional state function which Usery
4
protects from congressional interference. 1

B.

NGPA Section 102-New Natural Gas

NGPA section 102 establishes a maximum lawful price for
new onshore and offshore natural gas. 47 To qualify for the NGPA
section 102 price, the first sale of gas from a new onshore well or
reservoir or from a new lease on the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) or from certain other OCS leases must be new gas as defined in section 102.48 FERC is responsible for calculating new
gas ceiling prices according to a statutory formula based upon a
base price multiplied by an escalation factor. The ceiling prices
escalate on a monthly basis by a factor equal to the sum of an annual inflation adjustment factor for the month and a real growth
factor. As of January of 1983, the maximum lawful price for sec49
tion 102 gas was $3.299 per MMBtu.
While FERC has strictly applied the provisions of section

4 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
46 661 F.2d at 836.
47 15 U.S.C. § 3312(a),

(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
48
Id. § 3312(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
49
Publication of Prescribed Maximum Lawful Prices Under Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, Docket No. RM 80-53, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,935 (July 30, 1982) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
§ 271.101(a), 271.102). The FERC is required to compute and make available maximum
rates for each month. They are published every three months in the Federal Register. 15

U.S.C. § 3311(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
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102, a recent case from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, True
Oil Co. v. FERC,O has applied a more liberal reading to what
constitutes new gas. In that case, FERC had denied section 102
qualification to a well which had produced but not sold gas during testing prior to the April 20, 1977, qualification date for new
well production. The court noted the NGPA required production
"in commercial quantities," not mere production, to disqualify
this type of new gas from the section 102 price. 51 The court found
that the well had produced only 350 Mcf of gas before the well
was shut in to await a pipeline connection. The court rejected
FERC's argument that the well could have produced in commercial quantities prior to April 20, 1977.52
C. NGPA Section 103-New OnshoreProductionWells
NGPA section 103 provides an alternative price category for
new wells which do not qualify under section 102 because they
are within two and a half miles of existing wells or are not drilled
to the requisite completion depth. To qualify for the NGPA section 103 ceiling price, the wells must have been first drilled on or
after February 19, 1977, must meet federal or state well spacing
requirements and must not have been within a proration unit
existing at the date of initial drilling.M Generally, the ceiling
price for NGPA section 103 gas is equal to that set in NGPA section 102 for new natural gas, except that section 102 new gas is
adjusted for both inflation and a real growth factor, while NGPA
section 103 natural gas is adjusted only for inflation. The January
of 1983 maximum lawful price for section 103 gas was $2.722 per
MMBtu.
The FERC has applied a stringent rule equating initial drilling or "spudding '56 with surface drilling done on a one time only
50 663 F.2d75 (10th Cir. 1981).
51 Id. at 78.15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(C)(i/) (Supp. IV 1980).
52 663 F.2d at 78.
5 15 U.S.C. § 3313 (Supp. IV 1980).
54 Id. § 3313(c).
See note 49 supra.

' "Spudding' is a term used to connote the initial boring to a depth of approximately 100 feet in drilling an oil or gas well. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAs (4th ed. 1978).
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basis.57 Thus, the FERC treated an abandoned well as being first
drilled on the date it was originally spudded and not the date of
reentry after abandonment. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in L&B Oil Co. v. FERC,a8 recently held FERC's rule
was too restrictive. The court held that the classification of gas
produced from an abandoned, unsuccessful well subsequently reentered by the producers was not determined by the spud date of
the abandoned well. Therefore, L&B's drilling through the plug
in the old, unsuccessful well amounted to the initiation of a new
well.
To support its finding, the court pointed out that L&B had
incurred virtually all of the normal exploration costs and made
all of the production efforts in 1979 and that the efforts and expenditures, including directional drilling, resulted in a producing well.-9 According to the court, the NGPA explicitly intended
to provide price incentives for new production. Except for the
original spud date, as interpreted by the Commission, the well
met all the NGPA section 103 statutory criteria. Denying the
incentive price for making minimal use of a dry hole would violate the purpose of the statute. Even though the court limited its
holdings in the L&B decision to the circumstances of that case, 60
the decision provides guidance and authority for a more liberal
interpretation of the section 103 requirements.
D. NGPA Section 104 and NGPA Section 106(a)-Natural
Gas Committed or Dedicated to Interstate Commerce
NGPA section 10461 applies to gas which, on November 8,
1978, was committed or dedicated to interstate commerce and
for which a just and reasonable rate was in effect. Essentially,
NGPA section 104 incorporates, with adjustments for inflation,
the rates previously established under the NGA. The maximum
lawful price for section 104 gas may be the higher of either the
57 L&B Oil Co. v. FERC, 665 F.2d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1982); Interim Regulations
Implementing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,43 Fed. Beg. 56,448; 56,467 (1978).
58 665 F.2d at 758.
59
Id. at 764.
60
Id.
61 15 U.S.C. § 3314 (Supp. IV 1980).
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just and reasonable rate per MMBtu established by the Commission which was or would have been applicable to the first sale of
gas on April 20, 1977, adjusted for inflation, or any just and
reasonable rate established for the gas by the Commission after
April 20, 1977, and before November 9, 1978. FERC has the
authority under the NGPA to set a higher applicable ceiling price
so long as the higher price is "just and reasonable within the
meaning of the NGA. '' 62 FERC has issued a notice of inquiry
seeking discussion on establishing higher just and reasonable
prices for section 104, 106(b) and 109 gas. 3
The applicable maximum lawful price for NGPA section
106(a)64 interstate rollover gas is the higher of the just and reasonable rate established by the Commission and applicable on the
date the rollover occurs (adjusted for inflation), or fifty-four
cents per MMBtu as of April of 1977, adjusted monthly thereafter
by the inflation factor. As with section 104 gas, FERC may set a
higher rate for rollover gas if such rate is "just and reasonable
within the meaning of the NGA."'
Under NGPA section 104, FERC has the authority to provide
special relief rates for producers seeking to charge a rate in excess
of the maximum lawful, just and reasonable price. 6 However,
this relief vehicle has been virtually useless because the Commission has failed to issue regulations establishing a procedure for
obtaining special relief. 7 The Commission may abandon the special relief rulemaking if it moves ahead with increasing "just and
reasonable" rate levels under section 104(b) (2).
The prices provided in section 104 are well below the prices
provided in other sections of the NGPA. In effect, Congress
merely adopted the historical ratemaking used by the Commis-

62

Id.

63 Notice of Inquiry, Impact of the NGPA on Current and Projected Natural Gas

Markets, Docket No. RM82-26-000, 47 Fed. Beg. 19,157 (April 28, 1982). See text accompanying notes 148-63 infta for a discussion of recent FERC efforts to increase flowing gas
just and reasonable rates.
64 15 U.S.C. § 3316(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
',Id. § 3316(c).
6 Id. § 3314(b)(2).
67 See note 123 infra and accompanying text discussing the Commission's failure to
issue these regulations, as well as its failure to resolve other issues.
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sion to establish these prices. Some believe this lower priced gas
provides interstate pipelines with a "cushion" to keep the
weighted average cost of gas low despite purchases of expensive
new or uncontrolled gas.
E.

NGPA Section 105-Sales Under Existing Intrastate Contracts

NGPA section 105 -establishes ceiling prices for sales of natural gas under intrastate contracts which existed as of November
8, 1978, or the successors to those contracts. 68 Section 105(b)(1)
establishes the general price rule for intrastate sales in which contract prices were not higher than the section 102 new gas price on
the date of the NGPA enactment. The maximum lawful price for
such gas is the lower of the price under the terms of the existing
contract or the NGPA section 102 ceiling price. 9 If the contract
price on the date of enactment was greater than the new natural
gas price under section 102, section 105(b)(2) applies, setting the
price for such gas at the higher of the current section 102 price or
the original November of 1978 contract price, times an inflation
factor.
One of the most significant issues facing parties to intrastate
gas sales contracts involves state severance tax reimbursements.

Special rules apply to the recovery of or adjustment for severance
taxes for natural gas sold under existing intrastate contracts or
successors to such contracts and under intrastate rollover contracts.70 On January 1, 1980, the Commission issued a notice of
proposed rulemaldng to determine what prohibition, if any,
should be made with respect to recovery of severance taxes for intrastate sales. 71 The Commission's preliminary view was not to
limit recovery of severance taxes for sales under NGPA section

6' 15 U.S.C. § 3315(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
69 Id. § 3315(b)(1).

70 The regulations governing intrastate gas sales specifically state that reimbursement for severance taxes is in addition to maximum lawful prices. See 18 C.F.R. §

271.1102 (1981).
71 Proposed Regulations Under Section 110 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. 80-21, 45 Fed. Reg. 5747 (1980) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 271) (proposed Jan. 18, 1980).
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105(b)(2) of gas priced higher than section 102 new gas because
that section's pricing mechanism more closely resembled other
NGPA pricing mechanisms. On the other hand, FERC believed a
severance tax adjustment should not be permitted for sales under
NGPA section 105(b)(1) of gas priced lower than section 102 gas,
except to the extent the section 102 limitation prevented a seller
from collecting the full contract price.7 2 FERC reasoned that the
price payable under NGPA section 105(b)(1) was a freely negotiated contract price and the proceeds payable to the seller under
the contract are presumed sufficient to reimburse the seller adequately for severance taxes. 73
In November of 1980, FERC issued Order No. 108, which
provides that under existing intrastate contracts, successors to
such contracts and intrastate rollover contracts, sellers may not
collect state severance taxes in addition to the maximum lawful
price, unless 1) the contract already had a separate provision allowing for tax reimbursement, or 2) the severance tax increases
were made through legislation enacted after the NGPA.74
FERC reasoned that the starting point for NGPA section 105
ceiling prices was a level chosen by the parties and thus the total
proceeds paid to the seller could be presumed to include full
reimbursements for taxes levied as of the enactment of the
NGPA. Order No. 108 stated that specific tax reimbursement
provisions are not required in a gas sales contract, but some contractual authorization is required. A contract amendment is permitted to provide the necessary authorization. FERC, in the first
instance, will leave contract interpretation to the parties. A dispute over contract interpretation is to be resolved by the state
courts.
The regulations resulting from Order No. 108 were to be effective for natural gas deliveries on or after January 1, 1981. 75In
late December of 1980, however, shortly before the severance tax
regulations were to become effective, FERC stayed the effective
72

45 Fed. Beg. 5747 (1980).

73 Id.
74 Order No. 108, Sales of Natural Gas Made Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of

1978 That Are Sales of Intrastate Gas, Docket No. 80-21, 45 Fed. Beg. 76,664 (1980) (effectiveJan. 1, 1981).
75 Id.
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date of Order No. 108 pending a rehearing. 76 The stay was issued
on the condition that all payments for first sales of gas delivered
on or after January 1, 1981, be subject to refund with interest to
the extent payments exceed ceiling prices determined in the proceeding. As of December of 1982, FERC had not acted. As a result, enormous refund liabilities are mounting for sellers and purchasers.77
Another problem with section 105 is that the NGPA price
ceiling for the previously uncontrolled intrastate market does not
encourage enhanced production or continued production of marginal wells. Section 105 imposes a heavy penalty on intrastate
sales made at a very low price. Obviously, prior to the NGPA,
parties to intrastate contracts could simply renegotiate the contract to provide incentives for enhanced production. Recognizing
that fact, Order No. 107 attempted to provide an incentive for
production enhancement on old intrastate wells. 78 Order No. 107
issued regulations theoretically designed to encourage production
of reserves which otherwise would not be developed or would be
lost because existing NGPA section 105 prices were too low to
cover the costs of production enhancement. The new "incentive"
price for intrastate "qualified production enhancement gas" pursuant to the regulations is the lower of the renegotiated contract
price or the section 109 price. 79
There are three major problems with this "relief' extended to
intrastate sellers: 1) the "incentive" price is not high enough to be
a true incentive; 2) the Commission has required extensive and
cumbersome filings prior to undertaking enhanced production
work, and 3) the Commission imposed a maximum recovery for
enhanced production revenues actually received equal to 200 %
of the section 103 new gas prices. Given these difficulties, it

76

Natural Gas First Sale Regulations; Conditional Stay of Effective Date and
Granting of Rehearing, Docket No. RM80-21, 46 Fed. Reg. 2975 (1981).
77 Because of a lack of FERC guidance prior to issuance of Order No. 108, the Commission did not require a seller to refund those reimbursed state severance taxes relating to
gas delivered prior to January 1, 1981, which exceeded the tax amounts now receivable
under the amended rules.
78Order No. 107, High-Cost Natural Gas: Production Enhancement Procedures,
Docket No. BM80-50, 45 Fed. Reg. 77,421 (1980) (effective Dec. 15, 1980).
79 Id.
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should not be surprising that relatively few producers have taken
advantage of this incentive. 80
F. NGPA Section 107-High Cost Natural Gas
In NGPA section 107, Congress established four specific categories of high cost natural gas eligible for the special NGPA incentive price."' Those categories include gas produced from
depths below 15,000 feet, gas produced from geopressured brine,
occluded natural gas, gas produced from coal seams and gas produced from Devonian shale. 2 Pursuant to the NGPA, these categories of gas were decontrolled with the adoption of Phase I incremental pricing rules for industrial boiler fuel. In addition,
Congress vested the Commission with discretionary authority to
establish section 107 incentive prices for gas produced under conditions the Commission determines to represent extraordinary
risks or costs. Such prices need not be cost based.8
To date, FERC has exercised this discretionary authority
only to establish a special incentive price for gas produced from
designated "tight formations" in which the producing geological
structures are extremely dense. One other FERC proposal to exercise section 107 discretionary pricing for "near deep gas," gas
from wells between 10,000 and 15,000 feet deep, has met with
strong disapproval. 84 A third proposal to provide special rates for
certain offshore gas from deep water wells has been languishing
at the Commission for more than two years with no resolution,
although it generated little controversy when proposed in early
1980. Thus, the only action taken by the Commission concerns
tight formation gas.

80 As of August 4, 1982, the Commission had received 245 determinations involving
production enhancement volumes. A total of 24,348 MMcf of gas was indicated on these
applications. The Commission received 140 in 1982 and 105 in 1981. Given the thousands
of old intrastate wells, this is not a large number of petitions.
81 H.R. REp. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 8983, 9003; see 15 U.S.C. § 3317 (Supp. IV 1980).
82 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 9004.
83

Id.

See text accompanying notes 137-40 infra.
High-Cost Natural Gas Produced From Wells Drilled in Deep Water, Docket No.
RM80-28, 45 Fed. Reg. 47,863 (1980).
8

8
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At the end of 1982, the Commission had designated more
than one hundred formations, including additions, as tight formations eligible for the special incentive price under NGPA section 107.86 Order No. 99 established an incentive price for production from so-called "tight-gas" formations of 200% of the
NGPA section 103 price or the effective negotiated contract
price, whichever is lowerA.1 An effective negotiated contract
price is one established in the contract either by reference to
FERC's incentive pricing authority under section 107 or by a
fixed rate or fixed price escalation. Order No. 99 and its amendment is important not only because it sets a substantially higher
price for natural gas produced from tight formations but also because it sets out the Commission's guidelines for qualifying for
such higher prices.
Two applications for rehearing of Order No. 99 were filed by
producers who objected to, among other things, the Commission's failure to set an incentive price by reference to the crude oil
or fuel oil market prices and to the requirement of a negotiated
contract price. By forcing the use of certain words and provisions
in the contract, the producers asserted that the Commission violated section 101(b) (9) of the NGPA and the Mobile-Sierra-Memphis doctrines under which private contractual rights of producers and pipelines are preserved as long as those rights do not result in the collection of a price in excess of the maximum lawful
price.
In Order No. 99-A,89 the Commission denied rehearing and
rejected the producers' contentions, including the attack on the
negotiated contract price requirement. The Commission
reasoned that because its authority under section 107(b) is
limited to setting incentive prices necessary to encourage addi18 C.F.R. § 271.703(d) (1981).
Order No. 99, Regulations Covering High-Cost Natural Gas Produced From
Tight Formations, Docket No. RM 79-76, 45 Fed. Reg. 56,034 (1980) (codified at 18
C.F.R. § 271.703(a) (1981)).
8 See note 42supra and accompanying text.
89 Order No. 99-A, High-Cost Natural Gas Produced From Tight Formations; Order Denying Rehearing and Clarifying Order No. 99, Docket No. RM79-76, 45 Fed. Reg.
71,563 (1980) (amendments to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 271.701, 271.703(b)(1) and
271.702(a)(1)).
8

87
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tional production, the negotiated contract provision ensures that
the price collected under the contract is necessary to increase gas
production. The Commission also noted that parties are not
barred from renegotiating their contracts to qualify for the incentive price.
In Pennzoil v. FERC, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed FERC Order No. 99.9 The court concluded that the
Commission has authority to require contract pricing provisions
to assist it in identifying gas whose production entails such extraordinary risks or costs that it would not be undertaken absent the
availability of special incentive prices. The court found that the
Commission exercised such authority in a manner reasonably related to attaining congressional objectives and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the history of the
contract price requirement shows that the requirement itself is a
part of the definition of gas entitled to the special incentive price.
The requirement was promulgated, not under FERC authority
to prescribe the incentive, but rather to satisfy the Commission's
duty to define gas qualifying for that special price in a manner
consistent with the express mandate of the NGPA. If the contract
did not authorize price increases as incentives to enhance production, presumably the parties believed enhanced production did
not merit higher prices.
d.

NGPA Section 108-StripperWell Gas

NGPA section 108 establishes a maximum lawful price for
any first sale of gas which qualifies as stripper well gas. 9, Stripper
well gas is non-associated natural gas produced from a well
which, during the preceding ninety-day production period, did
not produce more than sixty Mcf per production day. In addition, during the prescribed period the well must have produced
at its maximum efficient rate of flow determined in accordance
with recognized conservation practices designed to maximize the
ultimate recovery of natural gas.92

'O671 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1982).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 3318 (Supp. IV 1980).
92

Id.
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The NGPA permits stripper wells to continue to qualify for
the section 108 incentive price if production increases above sixty
Mcf per day because certain recognized enhanced recovery techniques were applied. 93 The Commission has defined recognized
enhanced recovery techniques as processes or equipment, or
both, which when performed or installed by the producer, increase the rate of production of gas from the well. Normal well
maintenance, repair, replacement of equipment or facilities or
initial well completion, are not considered enhanced recovery
techniques.
H. NGPA Section 109-OtherCategoriesof Gas
NGPA section 10994 is designed to establish maximum ceiling
prices for certain categories of gas including:
1.) natural gas produced from any new well not otherwise
qualifying for a higher ceiling price under the NGPA;
2.) gas which on November 8, 1978, was committed or
dedicated to interstate commerce and for which a just
and reasonable rate under the NGA was not in effect;
3.) natural gas which on November 8, 1978, was not subject to an existing contract and not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce;
4.) natural gas produced from the Prudhoe Bay Unit on the
North Slope of Alaska and transported through the
system approved under the Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976. 91
In January of 1983, the section 109 price was $2.254 per
MMBtu.96
The crucial question in interpreting section 109 is the scope
of its applicability. The Commission has adopted a narrow reading of the section because it fears that under a.broad interpretation, a producer could circumvent a lower price applicable under
sections 104, 105 or 106 by drilling a new well, even though the

Id. § 3318(b)(2).
94 Id. § 3319.
95 Id. § 3319(a)(1)-(4).
96 See note 49 supra.
93
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well would not qualify as a new onshore production well under
section 103 or would not produce new gas under section 102.97
Thus, section 109 covers first sales of natural gas described in that
section only to the extent that such first sales are not covered by
any other maximum lawful price available under other sections
of Title 1.98
I.

NPGA Title II IncrementalPricing
1. Purposes: The Hierarchyof Natural Gas Uses

The political trade-off for increased prices and eventual decontrol of certain natural gas contained in Title I of the NGPA
was the incremental price provision of Title II which was designed to appeal to residential consumers. Title IIo reflects a congressional policy of imposing pricing penalties upon certain uses
of natural gas in favor of use by residential customers. This policy
was to be implemented in phases. In Phase I, which was to be
implemented within twelve months of the NGPA's enactment,
certain incremental gas costs were imposed on "industrial boiler
fuel facilities." Industrial boiler fuel facilities are those using natural gas to generate steam or electricity. 11Phase II, which the
FERC was to propose within eighteen months of the NGPA's enactment, extended incremental pricing to other industrial uses
determined by FERC.' 0° As discussed below, the Commission's
Phase II rule was subject to congressional review under procedures which have been challenged in court. 102
Title II provides a detailed mechanism for implementing incremental pricing. NGPA section 203 establishes a threshold

97

Order No. 72, Final Regulations Implementing Section 109 of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,915; 18,916 (1980).
98 Id. at 18,918; see Tenneco Exploration, Ltd. v. FERC, 649 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.
1981); Spradling Drilling Co., Declaratory Order Determining Maximum Lawful Price
Eligibility Under the NGPA, Docket No. GP80-2, mimeo at 3,14 FERC 61,145 (1981).
99 NGPA § 201-08,15 U.S.C. § 3341-3348 (Supp. 1980).
100 NGPA § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 3341 (Supp. IV 1980).
101 NGPA § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 3342 (Supp. IV 1980).
102 NGPA §§ 202(c), 507(b) & (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3342(c) & 3417(b),(c) (Supp. IV
1980).
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price for each of eight categories of gas; 13 amounts paid by interstate pipelines above these threshold levels must be passed
through to facilities identified for incremental pricing, up to the
point at which the rates and charges paid by any such facility
equal the cost of alternate fuels. 14 In limiting the effect of the incremental pricing surcharge, Title II was clearly not to drive industrial users from the natural gas market altogether, in which
case higher priority users would bear the entire weight of increased costs.
The incremental pricing program has two purposes: 1) to
mitigate the effects of rising gas costs brought about by Title I of
the NGPA on residential consumers and small commercial consumers, and 2) to discourage lower-priority users of gas, thus preserving a greater share of market supplies for residential and
small commercial use. Those features of the program were, from
a congressional view, a politically necessary quid pro quo for
higher wellhead prices.
However, Title II has not served the intended congressional
purposes. Under Phase I, incremental pricing surcharges raised
the prices paid by industrial boiler fuel users to the applicable alternative fuel ceiling prices as soon as the rule took effect. 1° Yet,
the benefit to a typical residental household using gas heat
amounted to only eight dollars a year, and Phase II, it was projected, would add only ten dollars more in savings, an amount
Congress found did not justify the extraordinary administrative
costs of extending the program. 06
2. PhaseI Rules: The Effect on IndustrialUse
While the Phase I rule imposing additional costs on boiler
103 The eight categories of gas are: (1) new natural gas; (2) natural gas under intrastate rollover contracts; (3) new, onshore production well gas; (4) LNG imports; (5) natural gas other than LNG imports; (6) stripper well natural gas; (7) high-cost natural gas,
and (8) gas from the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System. Separate threshold levels
are determined for state surcharge paid to other pipelines. 15 U.S.C. § 3343(a) (Supp. IV
1980).
104 NGPA § 204(c)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 3344(c)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
105 See Order No. 80, Rule Required Under Section 202 of the Natural Gas Policy
Act, Incremental Pricing, Docket No. RM80-10, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,622 (1980).
1W Id. at 31,639; see also 126 CONG. REc. H3839-3855 (daily ed. May 20, 1980) (de-
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fuel facilities continues to deter industrial boiler fuel use of natural gas, the operational effect of incremental pricing by FERC
is negligible. This is because state regulatory authorities, under
their own incremental pricing authorities, are maintaining the
rates charged to industrial boiler fuel users at levels that preclude
application of the incremental pricing surcharge; regulated rates
at the state level are near, or sometimes above, the alternative
fuel price and, as such, Title IUs incremental pricing provisions
have virtually no effect. 107 States often use such price discrimination of natural gas to achieve certain social objectives.10
The actual effect of incremental pricing under the NGPA
currently is to make the state incremental pricing programs feasible both politically and practically. With the federal program in
place, the states retain the incentive to preempt the federal program by implementing and managing their own incremental
pricing rules, 19 thereby using the incremental revenues paid by
industrial users the way they deem appropriate under state regulatory policies.
3. PhaseII Rules: Consumer Energy Council v. FERC
On May 6, 1980, the Commission issued its Phase II rule
which would have imposed incremental pricing on all nonexempt industrial users of natural gas, including industrial process gas and feedstocks." 0 The House of Representatives disapproved the Phase II rule by a resolution passed on May 20,
1980,111 pursuant to procedures set forth in NGPA sections 202(c)"

bate accompanying H.R. Beg. 655, 96th CIong., 2d Sess., disapproving the proposed rule
under NGPA section 202 on incremental pricing).
107 See Rule Required Under Section 202 of the Natural Gas Policy Act, Incremental
Pricing, supra note 105, at 31,624-25.
108 Natural Gas Regulation Study, supra note 3, at 243.
109 Rule Required Under Section 202 of the Natural Gas Policy Act, Incremental
Pricing, supranote 105, at 31,625.
110 Id. at 31,622.
111 126 CONG. REC. H3839-3855, supra note 106. Members of the House of Representatives questioned whether incremental pricing was needed at a time when there existed a
"temporary surplus of gas deliverability." Id. at 3839. They also noted "serious questions"
whether incremental pricing applied to nonbofler industrial uses "can effectively operate
as a market ordering device." Id.
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and 507(c) (3). This "one-house legislative veto" nullified the rule
and left only boiler fuel uses subject to the incremental pricing
surcharge.
Following the House of Representatives' resolution of disapproval, the Commission revoked the Phase II rule, declining to
challenge the constitutionality of the one-house legislative veto3
provision. 2 However, in Consumer Energy Council v. FERC1
the validity of FERC's revocation order was questioned. Representatives of industrial consumers and gas marketers intervened
in support of the House resolution and the FERC action.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found the one-house legislative veto provision of section 202(c)
unconstitutional. 14 The court held that the provision violated the
requirements of article I, section 7 of the Constitution by enabling one house of Congress to "enact a policy to which the
other house and the President did not agree originally."" 5 The
court also found that the one-house legislative veto violated the
separation of powers doctrine by allowing Congress, or a single
one of its houses, to control agency rulemaking directly6 rather
than through the laws under which the agency operates."
4.

Prospectsfor IncrementalPricing

ConsumerEnergy Council has been appealed to the Supreme7
Court and is to be decided in the October of 1982 term.1
Regardless of the Court's decision, Phase II of incremental pricing seems all but dead. Given the current deregulatory climate,
FERC's most likely policy choice is either a substantial or total

112 Incremental Pricing: Order Denying Rehearing and Revoking Amendments
Made by Order No. 80, Docket No. RM80-10, 45 Fed. Reg. 54,741 (1980).
113673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), appeal pending sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, No. 81-2008, Interstate Natural Gas Assn. v.
Consumer Energy Council, No. 81-2020, 50 U.S.L.W. 3896 (May 1, 1982).
14Id. at 448.
's6 Id. at 469.
11 Id. at 471-72.
117 The decision in Consumer Energy Council has far-reaching significance for constitutional law and will likely receive a thorough review by the Supreme Court. The
Court's analysis of the constitutional issues, however, will not necessarily reflect any legal
or policy judgment on the Phase II rule itself.
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revocation of the rule." 8 Further, congressional opposition to
incremental pricing does not appear to have moderated since the
House passed its resolution of disapproval. If FERC does not
modify or revoke the rule, Congress undoubtedly would attempt
to amend Title II itself.
Phase II of incremental pricing appears to be a moot issue for
two basic reasons. First, the price of gas in late 1982 had reached
the price of alternate fuels in much of the United States, thus
activating the exemption contained in the incremental pricing
sections of the NGPA. Second, Congress, including some of the
early proponents of incremental pricing, have determined such
pricing does not achieve the original policy goals.
III.

PROBLEMS PERCEIVED WITH THE NGPA

The combatants involved in the emergence of the NPGA
made little effort to change the NGPA during the first two years
after its enactment. An unusual spirit of "wait and see" and
cooperativeness emerged. FERC issued interim regulations
implementing the basic provisions of the Act with record
speed." 9 Moreover, FERC assisted both producers and state
agencies who were making the initial determinations on jurisdictional classifications of gas, by establishing. hotlines and holding
regional seminars throughout the country. All parties appeared
pleasantly surprised with the ease of implementation of this complex act during its first year.
The 1980 election year presented an opportunity for political
opponents to begin attempts to change the NGPA. Candidate
Reagan announced his opposition to natural gas price controls

118 Apparently, NGPA § 202 only requires FERC to issue a single Phase H rule. In
the event of congressional disapproval of the rule first promulgated, the Commission
"may" thereafter submit an amendment expanding the application of incremental pricing. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Commission must issue a substitute
rule. Moreover, the Commission arguably would be powerless to issue a new Phase II rule
after May 20, 1982; § 202(c)(2)(B)(ii) provides that such an amendment must be submitted to Congress not more than two years after the date of adoption of any congressional
resolution of disapproval.
119 Interim regulations were proposed five days after the law was enacted and were
published two weeks later on December 1, 1978.43 Fed. Reg. 56,448 (1978).
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and stated his intention to press for natural gas deregulation if
elected. With his election, the gas producing industry eagerly
awaited introduction of a gas deregulation bill. However, no
such legislation has been forthcoming. The President's announcement on March 1, 1982, that he would not forward gas deregulation legislation to the 97th Congress came as a fait accompli.
Since legislative changes to the NGPA were not made in the 97th
Congress, the current and potential problems of natural gas regulation under the NGPA become more urgent.
A.

Deteriorationof Regulatory Responsiveness to NGPA Issues

FERC's regulatory responsiveness in implementing the
NGPA as it exists is a critical concern to those directly affected by
the regulation-producers, distribution companies, consumers of
natural gas, pipeline companies and the practitioners representing them. Those who view only the macroeconomic effect of gas
regulations are less concerned. Initial implementation of the
NGPA was dynamic, but FERC has faltered significantly in subsequently addressing NGPA regulatory issues. FERC's failure to
resolve issues involving the treatment of certain gas costs and incentives cumulatively exacerbates and clouds the regulation versus deregulation issue. More important, by so doing, FERC undermines its own authority.
The previously discussed treatment of severance taxes in sales
of intrastate gas is only one example of regulatory indecision and
delay. 20 Other basic questions remain. First, a rulemaking on the
fundamental issue of the pass-through of gathering and production costs for all natural gas sales has been pending since December of 1980.121 Without a definite rule on the matter, FERC purports to be acting on a case-by-case basis. This situation is not unusual at FERC today. On at least five critical issues, FERC has
had an opportunity to act but has not done so decisively. In each

120 See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra for a discussion of severance taxes in
sales of intrastate gas.
121 Gathering Allowances and Compression Allowances Under Section 110 of the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978; Notice of Inquiry, Docket Nos. RM80-73, RM80-74, 45
Fed. Reg. 84,814 (1980) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 271).
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instance, prompt action by FERC could have clarified the major
gas pricing issues stated at the outset.
Second, in August of 1979, FERC issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking to provide special relief to encourage production of
interstate natural gas which could not be economically produced
under existing NGPA sections 104, 106 and 109 prices.12 A final
staff draft of these regulations was released in May of 1980.12
More than two years later, the Commission has not acted on the
final draft.' Thus interstate gas which could be in production is
lost to the market. Producers may justifiably be holding in abeyance plans for enhanced recovery of interstate gas pending an
action by FERC.
Third, Congress has provided producers a type of relief
through adjustment procedures in section 502(c) of the NGPA in
order to prevent special hardship, inequity or unfair distribution
of burdens. Under similar statutory language,l 5 the Department
of Energy has provided broad guidelines and processed hundreds
of cases through the Office of Hearings and Appeals providing
for special relief under the price regulations governing oil and
gas. But again, the Commission has required such severe showings of hardship (much more stringent than the Department of
Energy) so as to render the section useless in all but the most egregious circumstances.
Fourth, FERC's treatment of the application of "area rate
clauses" in interstate contracts existing under the NGPA is

1

2 Procedures Governing Applications for Special Relief Under Sections 104, 106
and 109 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978; Docket No. RM79-67, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,468
(1979) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2 and 271).
123 Procedures Governing Applications for Special Relief Under Sections 104, 106
and 109 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Docket No. RM79-67, 45 Fed. Reg. 31744
(1980) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2 and 271).
12 FERC recently issued two orders granting special relief on an individual basis,
Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., Docket No. R178-78-000, 20 FERC 61,136 (1982) and Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., Docket No. 82-3-000, 20 FERC 61,137 (1982). In these orders,
FERC acknowledged it has previously refused to grant such individual relief petitions
pending resolution of the rulemaking. FERC gave no indication whether it intended to
abandon the rulemaking. These orders specifically stated the cases required special, expedited treatment. Whether FERC will reverse its position and consider individual petitions either in lieu of or in addition to the proposed rules is still an open question.
125 42 U.S.C. § 7194 (Supp. IV 1981).

KENTUCKy LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

another example of hesitant regulation. Area rate clauses, contained in contracts executed under the NGA, are price escalator
clauses which allow contract prices to rise to the regulated area
rate ceiling price set for the type of gas covered by the contract.
FERC maintained these clauses would not be effective contractual authority to permit collection of the prices allowed by the
NGPA, even though the parties to interstate contracts could
amend those contracts to allow for collection of the applicable
NGPA wellhead prices. 12a Commentators overwhelmingly disagreed with FERC's position. Consequently, FERC reversed
itself in Order No. 23, the first in a series of orders dealing with
area rate clauses. 27 FERC stated that "area rate clauses may be
relied on by the parties to a contract as authority for an increase
in rates to Natural Gas Policy Act statutory ceilings" and that, in
the case of objections by third parties, "considerable weight will
be given to the interpretation ascribed to the contract by its parties." FERC concluded that because there was little evidence
indicating Congress intended to preclude the operation of area
rate clauses (and similar contractual provisions), such a result
was not required by the statute.
Consequently, the Commission decided that the effectiveness
of each clause was a matter of contract law and could not be
dealt with by a blanket rulemaking determination. Great weight
12 See discussion of background issues in Interim Regulations Implementing the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and Regulations under the Natural Gas Act, Docket No.
RM79-22, 44 Fed. Beg. 10,336 (1979) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 154, 270 and 273);
and Final Regulations Amending and Clarifying Regulations Under the Natural Gas Policy Act and the Natural Gas Act, Docket No. RM79-22, 44 Fed. Reg. 16,895 (1979) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R.).
127Docket No. RM79-22. This Docket includes Order No. 23, Final Regulations
Amending and Clarifying Regulations under the Natural Gas Policy Act and the Natural
Gas Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 16,895 (1979); Rate Schedules and Tariffs; Rules Generally Applicable to Regulated Sales of Natural Gas; Order on Rehearing of Order No. 23, 44 Fed
Reg. 30,681 (1979) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts 154, 270); Order No. 23-A, Regulated
Sales of Natural Gas; General Rules and Definitions, 44 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (1979) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 270); Order No. 23-B, Order Adopting Final Regulations Established Protest Procedures Regarding Blanket Affidavit Filings and Interim and Retroactive
Collection Filings, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,834 (1979) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 154);
Amendment and Clarification of the Commissioners Interim Regulations, Order on Rehearing of Order No. 23-A, 18 FED. POWER SERV. (MB) 5-970 (1979); 18 C.F.R. §§ 154,
157,270,273 (1981).
1' 44 Fed. Reg. 16,895; 16,904 (1979).
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was to be given to the intent of the parties and to the commercial
context surrounding the clause. 129 As a result of the approach
adopted by FERC in Order No. 23, the details of guidelines to be
followed in interpreting specific area rate clauses became a matter of continuing concern and, in many respects, the central issue
in the area rate clause controversy.
In Order No. 23-A,s FERC answered in the affirmative the
question of whether amendments could be freely entered into by
the parties, rejecting any requirement of additional specific consideration as an essential element of such an amendment. The
Commission would consider protests as to the adequacy of consideration on a case-by-case basis while reviewing a pipeline's filing. The applicable standard for adequate consideration is the
"fraud, abuse or similar grounds" test applied under NGPA section 601.
To answer the numerous questions regarding the protest procedures, FERC issued Order No. 23-B. 13' Because of the limits of
FERC's non-price regulatory control, the protest procedures only
affect sections 104, 106(a), 108 and 109(a)(2) categories of gas.
Under the order, evidence of agreement between the pipeline
and the producer as to the collection of the NGPA price creates a
rebuttable presumption that the parties to the contract did have
an intent to make such a collection.132
This series of orders satisfied neither producers nor consumers, all of whom challenged FERC's litany of orders in court.
In Pennzoil v. FERC,33 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals basically upheld FERC's determinations. However, because FERC
was not decisive as to the intent of the parties to the contracts in
its case-by-case review of area rate clauses, protests abounded. '1

129 Id. at 30,681; 30,632 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 154 and 270). The Commission observed that "where the Commission must rule on the proper interpretation of a
contracts clause, references will be made not only to the four corners of the contract, but
also to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract." id.
13o Id. at 34,472; 34,473.
131 Id. at 38,834.
132 Id. at 38,834; 38,836.
13 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1000 (1982).
13 FERC attempted once again to clarify its position on area rate clauses in Opinion
No. 77, Independent Oil and Gas Ass'n of West Virginia, Opinion and Order Reversing
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Literally hundreds of contracts remain in administrative litigation through third party protests, and FERC still has not adopted
clear guidelines.
FERC's proposal to establish incentive rates for "near deep
gas" illustrates a fifth problem area. It again demonstrates the
agency's attempt to address regulatory pricing problems without
an appreciation of the political or public relations problems involved. On December 30, 1981, the Commission proposed setting special incentive rates for gas produced from wells 10,000 to
15,000 feet deep which were spudded or drilled deeper into a
new reservoir after that date.1 - This so-called "intermediate
deep gas" or "near deep gas" would be priced at 150% of the
NGPA section 103 new onshore gas or the equivalent of approximately four dollars per MMBtu.
The Commission originally solicited comments on the petition to set these rates in July of 1980. From information derived
from those comments, the Commission determined the cost of
production at depths greater than 10,000 feet is three to six times
greater than the cost of production of shallow gas. From this
data, the Commission concluded that gas production from
10,000 to 15,000 feet presented extraordinary risks and costs for
which the present applicable maximum lawful price did not
compensate. The Commission noted that NGPA section 107(b)

Initial Decision, Remanding and Consolidated Proceedings, Initiating Hearings, Established Procedures, and Granting Intervention, Docket Nos. R1I74-188 and 175-21, 45
Fed. Reg. 16541 (1980). As a general rule, FERC will give effect to the parties' interpretation of their contractual intent. The Commission reiterated that in a situation in which the
parties to a gas sales contract agree as to the intent of an area rate clause within the contract, but their interpretation is contested by a third party, the contracting parties' mutual
understanding is to control unless the third party can show that the contract language is
clearly inconsistent with such an interpretation or can produce convincing extrinsic evidence contradicting the interpretation of the parties. But FERC was not satisfied with this
approach and in Opinion No. 135, remanding protest dismissals to an administrative law
judge for reconsideration, stated, "It was never the Commission's intention to present an
insurmountable barrier to third party protestors ....
although such protestors were to
have a greater burden than the contracting parties in showing the contract precluded the
interpretation urged by its principals. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion
and Order Remanding for Limited Purposes, Docket No. GP80-24, 17 FERC 61,232
(1981) (issued Dec. 11, 1981).
135 High-Cost Natural Gas Produced From Intermediate Deep Drilling, Docket No.
RM82-8, 47 Fed. Beg. 638 (1981) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 271, 273 and 274).
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allowed the Commission to establish ceiling prices which exceed
the otherwise applicable maximum lawful price "to the extent
necessary to provide reasonable incentives." The NGPA conference report and court decisions interpreting the NGPA have established that such incentive prices need not be cost-based. 1-1
As with other proposals to increase gas prices, Congress and
consumer groups were most critical of the proposal. Commissioners Sheldon and Hughes expressed concern and disapproval
regarding the type of general information which FERC had received from producers to bolster producers' assertions that higher
prices are needed for intermediate deep gas. As FERC made
clear in its proposed rulemaking, the Commission requested specific cost, production and reserve information. 3, 7
Privately, FERC officials concede such criticism may have
less bearing on the elements of this specific proposed rulemaking
than on the fact that notice of this proposal was issued about the
same time that proposals to raise the price of old flowing interstate gas were publicized. Given the extremely negative reaction
of many members of Congress and consumer groups, coupled
with the reluctance of most gas producers to provide cost justification data, adoption of the intermediate deep gas rule will be
difficult. Nevertheless, the FERC recently reiterated its intention
to issue the rule, but gave no indication as to a date for such an issuance. 13

However, without such a rule, the misallocation of exploratory and production funds might continue. The range between
10,000 and 15,000 feet might not be fully explored or produced
because costs are too great. In areas where near deep gas is likely
to be found, producers will be much more inclined to drill down
'1 See H. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 8983, 9003; Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d at 378.

137 Part of the problem with receiving such information is the public nature of a pro-

posed rulemaking. A more generic problem is that the FERC has no statutory authority to
preserve the confidentiality of material submitted to it. Thus, under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), such data is available to all parties. Obviously, in the

area of deep gas drilling where seismographic and reserve data are scarce and expensive, a
competitor would be most eager to obtain such data from FERC's Office of Public Information at no expense other than the photocopying charge.

138 See Goldking Prod. Co., Order Dismissing Petition for Determination of HighCost Gas and Prescription of an Incentive Price, 21 FERC § 61,117 (1982).
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to 15,000 feet and below to receive the decontrolled price for
deep gas. Yet once again, in part because of FERC's politically
inept timing of this proposal, it is now politically impossible to
adopt the measure.
In sum, the FERC persistently refuses to allow its own orders
to take effect and stand as final. In the case of severance tax
treatment, guaranteed cost pass-through, Btu content measurement of gas, blanket pipeline certification authority and others,
FERC issues final "orders" and then almost immediately stays
the effect of those orders pending a petition for rehearing on the
matter. As a result, regulated parties are at jeopardy in taking
immediate action based upon FERC "final" orders because these
orders are likely to be changed within days. FERC appears to be
strangling itself in its failure to promulgate needed regulations
and the constant re-examinations and classifications of those regulations it does promulgate. If more of the Commission's statutory authority under the NGPA were actually exercised, the
market problems discussed previously might well be mitigated to
some degree. At least the natural supply and demand factors
could function more reasonably.
B.

DisparityBetween the Interstateand IntrastateMarkets

Both houses of the 97th Congress held extensive hearings on
the NGPA, its effectiveness and its weaknesses.139 These hearings
focused on the macroeconomic issue of gas regulation and the
overall impact of the NGPA. As might be expected, consumer
groups (representing individuals, homeowners, the elderly, persons on fixed incomes and others) and state regulatory agencies in
major gas consuming states favored retaining the NGPA or extending indefinitely NGPA price control authority. On the other
side, most gas producers and state regulatory agencies in states
producing more than their consumption urged more rapid gas
deregulation. Interstate pipelines have generally skirted the de139 NaturalGas Policy and RegulatoryIssues: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). The House Subcommittee

on Fossils and Synthetic Fuels of the Committee on Energy and Commerce held hearings
on July 26, July 30, August 6, August 9, September 17 and September 20, 1982, regarding
natural gas issues.
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regulation issue, but have sought to retain old gas at the lower
rates.
The debate during these hearings focused upon this fundamental issue of regulation versus free market. Few, if any, spe140
cific legal criticisms of NGPA's actual operation were lodged.
In discussing this basic policy issue of regulation, certain themes
recur. Market bidding disparities between the interstate and intrastate markets and the natural gas price spike or "fly-up" expected in 1985 received wide discussion, along with corollary
contract clause problems and the loss of energy markets to alternative fuels.
1.

The PerceivedProblemof Market Disparities

One of the primary problems, both actual and potential,
cited as requiring amendment of the NGPA is the alleged disparity between intrastate and interstate pipelines in bidding for additional supplies of new gas.141 The argument is that interstate
pipelines, which have a long history of enjoying lower prices for
natural gas because of the FPC regulation of wellhead prices
under the NGA continue to benefit from that cushion of cheap
old flowing gas.
The NGPA purported to eliminate the dual market system of
regulated interstate and unregulated intrastate pipelines which
existed prior to its enactment. But NGPA's practical effect was
not to eliminate the disparity; instead, it froze into existence the
price controls for flowing interstate gas and flowing intrastate
gas (with some allowance for inflation), and created a third pricing distinction for gas discovered after enactment of the NGPA.
140 NGPA provisions have been challenged many times in the courts. The NOPA
withstood challenges to Title I dealing with producer prices, Oklahoma v. FERC, 661
F.2d at 832, but Title II, dealing with incremental pricing, remains under attack on constitutional as well as other grounds before the Supreme Court in Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council, No. 81-2008 and Interstate Natural Gas Assn. v.
Consumer Energy Council, No. 81-2020, 50 U.S.L.W. 3896 (May 1, 1982).
141 The problems of the dual market system of interstate and intrastate gas markets
are not new. As one author put it, "The NGPA presents a Congressional response to the
disparity of regulatory treatment created by Phillipsin the same way the Natural Gas Act
was a response to the disparity created by Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Company."
Nordhaus, supranote 34, at 857.
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In this new pricing market, some gas, such as deep gas as defined
in section 107 of the NGPA, is totally deregulated. Much of the
gas, including NGPA section 102, new gas and section 103 new
onshore production gas sells at very high prices compared to
prices for old flowing gas. Current NGPA prices for old flowing
interstate gas reflect the regulated prices, with an inflation adjustment allowed under the NGA. As a result, some interstate
pipelines have a significant "cushion" of relatively low priced old
gas. It is estimated that the cushion will increase after certain
natural gas is deregulated beginning in 1985.142
Presumably this cushion allows interstate pipelines to outbid
intrastate pipelines (whose higher average flowing gas prices reflect the previously unregulated prices of that market) for postNGPA new gas, new onshore production gas, high cost gas and
totally unregulated gas. For example, tax records from the State
of Texas show that in January of 1981, the average cost of gas to
interstate pipelines was $1.37 per Mcf while the cost to intrastate
pipelines was $2.18 per Mcf; in August of 1981, the average cost
to interstate pipelines was $1.67 per Mef and to intrastate pipelines was $2.54 per Mef.14
Such disparities arguably make it difficult for intrastate pipelines or purchasers to bid competitively on marginal supplies of
gas coming into the market, nearly all of which fall within the
higher prices permitted under the NGPA. To further bolster their
argument for a free market for all gas pricing, proponents note
the decline in reserve to production ratios since 1978.'" This situation is being felt, although only approximately three percent of
the supply is deregulated. The real concern is the impact on the
intrastate market and dual market system in 1985 and 1987 when

142 See R. Means, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that "the natural gas cushion will not
be evenly distributed between interstate and intrastate pipelines.... [Iinterstate pipelines will have a substantially larger cushion than intrastate ones").
143 Texas Energy and Natural Resources Advisory Council, Impact of the NGPA on
Current and Projected Natural Gas Markets: Comment Pursuant to the Notice of Inquiry,
Docket No. 82-26-000 at 24-B (Aug. 1982) (Table 8, Texas Average Price and Quantity by
Company for First Purchases in Jan. 1981 and Aug. 1981).
144 Energy Information Administration, An Analysis of the Naturaai Policy Act
and Several Alternatives, Part I. The Current State of the Natural Gas Market, Table 8, at
40 (Dec. 1981) (pre-publication draft).
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much of the natural gas, other than old flowing interstate gas,
will be deregulated.
If NGPA gas prices remain unchanged at that time, a significant portion of the gas supply of certain interstate pipelines will
be priced at the lower, old flowing gas rates still subject to price
control, while prices for the new deregulated gas are expected to
make a sharp "fly up." By comparison, the intrastate pipelines
would have only their considerably higher priced gas which remains under contract to cushion their prices. Thus, intrastate
pipelines not only will have considerably higher average costs for
gas, but, because of this higher price, will also have difficulty
competing with the interstate pipelines in bidding for the still
more costly supplies of gas. At some point, if their average gas
costs exceed the market clearing costs, customers of intrastate
pipelines will simply switch to alternate fuels.
However, this argument presumes that each interstate pipeline has a significant cushion of old flowing gas priced at the
lower rate and that each intrastate pipeline has no similar
cushion of low priced gas controlled by its own contractual authorities. Such assumptions might not be wholly valid. In opposition to the argument, it should be noted that certain gas is currently being sold at well below NGPA ceiling prices based upon
actual contracts, and some producers are having difficulty selling
new gas supplies. Certainly, the percentage of old gas under contract for various interstate pipelines varies widely, from a low of
twenty-nine petcent to a high of seventy-nine percent. Thus, as
might be expected, the average acquisition cost for interstate
pipelines based upon those statistics varies widely from a low of
$1.30 per Mcf to a high of $2.76 per Mef.145 While statistics from
intrastate pipelines are less readily available, it may well be that
a similar disparity exists among those pipelines.
2.

FERCsAdministrativeAttempts to Address
the Market DisparityProblem

To the extent the NGPA has vested discretion with FERC,
FERC has proposed to address the market disparity through its
145

Id. Table 25, at 69.
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administrative procedures. Unfortunately, because of the extreme political conflict between competing interest groups involved in the issue of gas pricing, all administrative actions proposed by FERC have been subjected to substantial public and
congressional criticism. As with all administrative agencies, public and political opinion, in addition to evidentiary submissions,
influence the decision-making process in varying degrees.
Since the fall of 1981, discussions have ensued regarding the
review of prices of old flowing interstate gas, as classified in
NGPA sections 104(b)(2), 106(c) and 109(b)(2). Price increases
were urged, in part, to deal with market disparities. Certain
FERC officials referred to these discussions as "administrative
decontrol,"146 a rather poor choice of words in terms of accuracy
and publicity, and a phrase which drew the attention-and the
7
ire-of important members of Congress and consumer groups.14
Use of this inaccurate phrase has tended to obscure the substantive discussion of the issues in the press, before the agency
and within Congress. The NGPA specifically grants FERC
authority to establish higher alternate prices for old flowing gas
as defined in NGPA sections 104(b) (2), 106(c) and 109(b) (2) at a
rate which is "just and reasonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act." The NGA meaning of just and reasonable has
been amply interpreted by the courts. The courts have held that
cost is not the only basis for just and reasonable rates. 4 FERC
can, in effect, establish higher rates for old flowing interstate gas
through the authority granted it by Congress in the NPGA and

146 Speech by Charles Moore, FERC General Counsel, Federal Energy Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 14,1982).
147Resolutions urging FERC not to take such action were introduced in the Senate
by Senator Chafee (R-R.I.) and in the House by Representative John Dingell (D.-Mi.),
Chairman of FERC's jurisdictional committee, the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Both resolutions have a significant number of co-sponsors.
148 In American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978), the Court observed: "In general vintaging is a method of
pricing gas on the basis of cost at the time of production. However, the agency is not
bound strictly to cost. The Commission 'must be free ...to devise methods of regulation
capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests."' Id. (citing Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FTC, 417 U.S. at 331, which quoted Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at
767).
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by relying upon NGA principles as interpreted by the courts. 149
Courts also have noted specifically that the enactment of the
NGPA signaled a definitive move away from cost based pricing. 1'0 The establishment of such just and reasonable rates, even
though not based upon cost factors, in no way constitutes "administrative decontrol" of gas prices. The rates must satisfy the
well defined and specifically interpreted court concepts of "just
and reasonable rates" developed during the years of NGA regulation. Basically, such rates would be subject to the same type of
development and justification as rates established under the
NGA which considered both cost and non-cost factors, including
the replacement cost of gas.''
After great internal debate over whether to propose a rulemaking and if so what it should contain, FERC compromised by
releasing a notice of inquiry (NOI) in early 1982 addressing the
question of the market disparities..' 2 The NOI was an attempt to
gather information to determine the true extent of the market
disparity. The NOI primarily sought public comments and data
submissions to discover the exact nature of the economic distortions between the interstate and intrastate markets and the distortions likely to occur with decontrol of new gas in 1985. The
NOI requested comments on appropriate Commission responses
to such economic distortions. Also solicited were comments on
the alternatives posed by the Commission in response to such
problems: 1) elimination of vintaging and establishment of new
just and reasonable rates pursuant to sections 104, 106 and 109;
2) restrictions on contract terms such as indefinite price escalation clauses and take-or-pay clauses, and 3) revisions of pipeline
regulations to eliminate rolled-in pricing and to require marginal
pricing for the purchase of decontrolled gas at the wellhead. The
NOI also solicited comments on FERC's legal authority to undertake actions necessary to apply such alternatives.

I" See 417 U.S. at 307-10 (1974); FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380,399 (1974); Permian
Basin Area Rates Cases, 390 U.S. at 815.

ISO See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d at 367.
151 See American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978).
152 See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 65. See text accompanying notes 141-45 supra
for a discussion of market bidding disparities between the intrastate and interstate markets
for natural gas.
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Creating higher just and reasonable rates for old flowing interstate gas is one major solution urged by FERC to address the
marketing bidding disparities between the interstate and intrastate markets for natural gas. The biggest question regarding
raising flowing interstate gas prices is whether such a move
would merely reverse the problem and shift the competitive advantage to the intrastate market, which in the pre-NGPA era traditionally enjoyed an advantage in gas acquisition. FERC has
little, if any, data concerning the intrastate natural gas market,
prices and controls. The NOI was in part an attempt to gather
such informations so that FERC could determine the price at
which the interstate "cushion" of relatively low priced gas would
reverse.
General Counsel Charles Moore has noted the wide disparity
among the interstate pipeline prices shown in PGA filings, which
reveal that some interstate pipelines have average gas costs almost twice the average costs of other pipelines.' 4 This discrepancy further complicates the task of raising flowing interstate gas
rates to equalize gas costs for both interstate and intrastate pipelines, particularly given the historic role of pipelines as purchasers and resellers. Realistically, the economics of gas purchases are likely to fluctuate between the interstate and intrastate markets, and it may well be impossible to strike a balance
through regulation.
A staff technical analysis, Ir issued shortly after the NOI, addresses a revised and updated pricing structure using the Opinion
No. 77010 rate-making methodology. The Opinion No. 770 methodology was the pricing structure last used under the NGA before the enactment of the NGPA. This pricing mechanism, with

13 Several commentators did present extensive data, including economic projections, in response to the Notice of Inquiry, supra note 65. See Joint Comments of Indicated
Producers, presented before FERC, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 26, 1982).
154 Speech by Charles Moore, FERC General Counsel, Federal Energy Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 14, 1982).
ls' Staff Techiical Report, Impact of the NGPA on Current and Projected Natural
Gas Markets, Docket No. RM 82-26-000, mimeo (June 3,1982).
10 Opinion and Order Prescribing Uniform National Rate for Sales of Natural Gas,
Docket No. RM 75-14, Opinion No. 770, 41 Fed. Reg. 33,364 (1976), modified, 41 Fed.
Beg. 42,979 (1976) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2 & 154).
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changes approved by the courts, employs some vintaging and
takes into account the need for incentives in the gas industry as
well as other public policy goals. 157 This method deviates from
the strict cost-based pricing method previously used.
The question with the application of this method is whether,
given the price incentives of the NGPA, additional price incentives can still be justified or should be approved. Using this methodology with only slight modifications, prices for old gas in 1981
would range between $5.02 and $8.17 per Mcf.158 Political pressures would not permit such prices now, even if market conditions would. Also, given the change in the gas market brought
about by the NGPA, one must question whether the Opinion No.
770 methodology would still be relevant.
Eliminating the vintaging concept, whether gradually or immediately, would also eliminate the unrealistically low prices for
old flowing gas. The NGA seems to permit such an elimination of
vintaging.159 In previous opinions, FERC announced its intention
to eliminate vintaging.160 In Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically approved abandonment of the
vintaging concept.161 However, it is unclear what will be substituted for the vintage price. Eliminating a current pricing scheme
does not necessarily lead to a new and better scheme.
C. PriceFly-Up in 1985?
The specter of substantial price increases for natural gas

157 National Rates for Jurisdictional Sales of Natural Gas Dedicated to Interstate
Commerce, Opinion and Order on Rehearing, Docket No. RM75-14, Opinion No. 770-A,
41 Fed. Beg. 50,199 (1976) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2 & 154).
1M Staff Technical Report, supra note 155, at 17, 20.
159 Prior to the issuance of the Notice of Inquiry, the FERC staff developed.a comprehensive legal analysis of the Commission's authority to eliminate vintaging and thus increase the prices for old flowing interstate gas. In a November 10, 1981, memorandum to
Chairman Butler, Philip Marston of the Office of General Counsel concluded that such
legal authority existed under the NGA and §§ 104(b)(2), 106(c), and 109(b)(2) of the
NOPA. While disagreemnts will exist as to the wisdom of raising old gas rates and the specific methodology for doing so, the Commission does have the legal authority to address
the issue.
16o Area Rates for the Appalachian and Illinois Basin Areas, 48 F.P.C. 1299 (1972).
'61 520 F.2d 1061, 1077-78 (5th Cir. 1975, cert. denied,426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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when decontrolled in 1985, commonly called the gas "fly-up" or
the "price spike," is another area of debate in considering amendments to the NGPA. The spike or fly-up would occur because
many natural gas purchase contracts contain price escalation
clauses tied to the highest authorized price, the price of some
other commodity such as No. 2 or No. 6 fuel oil, or the price paid
for similar gas produced in the same or a specified area. These
clauses would be triggered only when the price of gas is deregulated. Often the clauses are included to protect producers from
discriminatory treatment by purchasers and/or from litigation
instituted by royalty owners to collect their royalties based upon
prices higher than those actually received by the producer. 162
Whatever the logical and actual basis for such clauses, if allowed to operate following price deregulation, they could and
probably would cause a domino effect. The overall price would
increase and so would the cost of natural gas to ultimate consumers. A gas price spike could exacerbate any market disparities
between the interstate and intrastate markets, result in customers
turning to lower priced alternate fuels and generally be detrimental to the economy. In enacting the NGPA, Congress intended that escalating inflation factors would gradually move
the price of gas up so that upon decontrol in 1985 gas prices theoretically would equal those for alternative fuels. 16 At least as of

1982, the cost of alternate fuels has increased much more rapidly
than projected in 1978 and the inflation rates for NGPA prices
have not kept up with the prices of alternate fuels.
A basic assumption here is that the price of deregulated gas
will fly up immediately. This assumption is taken for granted because of the strong history of price increases in gas shortages;
however, evidence during the summer of 1982 suggests that the
market clearing price for gas is not unlimited. Interstate pipelines began exercising "market out" clauses in existing contracts

162 In

fact, the Department of the Interior, one of the nation's largest royalty interest

owners by virtue of its management of federal lands, has proposed regulations which, if

adopted, would 'assume" a minimum price was received by the producer and collect
royalties based upon that "assumed" price. Notice of Hearing on Fair Market Value of
OCS Gas for Royalty Purposes, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,423 (1982).

163 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 65, at 19, 157-59.
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for deregulated gas. 164 Typically, these clauses permit the pur-

chaser to terminate the contract or to reduce the price paid for
gas if the contract price exceeds a level the purchaser deems to be
the market price of alternate fuels. Also, when crude oil prices

were deregulated the price of crude oil did not increase dramatically because of market factors. Ie The actual level to which natural gas prices might climb after deregulation will be affected
most by general economic conditions at the time. The current
recessionary economy may favor immediate deregulation of gas
prices because economic conditions would restrict the prices of
natural gas; however, it is impossible to predict what the economic picture will be in 1985.
Regardless of market responses, some pipelines and consumers urge that, even with deregulation, free market forces will
not be able to operate and producer prices will not respond to the
market place because existing contract terms favor the producer.
It is argued that indefinite price escalator clauses, such as most
favored nation clauses and alternate fuel parity clauses coupled
with take-or-pay clauses, insulate the producer from market
forces. 10 Since gas contracts typically tend to be for ten years or

16 See Fosters Natural Gas Report, May 6, 1982, at 1, and June 10, 1982, at 6, reporting exercise of market out clauses by Transco Pipeline and Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline; see also United Energy Unit Rescinds Gas Orderswith 104 Suppliers,The Wall St. J.,
Aug. 25, 1982, at4, col. 2.
16 Of course, controls on crude oil and natural gas are not completely analogous.
Crude oil had been price controlled for a relatively short time, compared with natural gas.
Moreover, crude oil was gradually decontrolled so that an increasing amount each month
was eligible for decontrol.
166
FERC's Notice of Inquiry includes the possibility of administrative revision of
take-or-pay clauses in gas purchase contracts. Many opponents of gas deregulation attack
the use of these clauses and of indefinite price escalator clauses on the same grounds and
with the same argument. The two types of clauses are, however, substantially different.
Take-or-pay clauses generally establish: 1) when the purchaser must begin taking gas or at
least paying for gas if the purchaser chooses not to make actual takes; 2) how must gas the
purchaser must pay for on a daily or monthly basis whether or not the gas is actually
taken, and 3) that the purchaser must take from the well on an equal basis with other wells
in the field and other wells from which gas is taken by the purchaser.
Take-or-pay clauses serve several important purposes other than insulating producers from market forces. Such clauses provide cash flow to offset the major capital investment which producers previously made. These clauses also protect the producers by
keeping up well production to avoid drainage by other wells in which the producer owns
no interest. Without such production, producers could be subject to royalty owner suits
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more, 167 these contracts will last well into deregulation. In congressional hearings and before FERC, many witnesses have
urged legislative action to prohibit the operation of such producer price escalation clauses and take-or-pay clauses prior to
NGPA's 1985 decontrol date.
A number of pipelines already have protected themselves by
including "market-out" clauses in more recently executed contracts. In fact, twenty-two percent of the old gas contracts containing indefinite price escalator clauses on file with FERC have
purchaser recourse provisions to protect against high natural gas
prices. 168 Application of such contract clauses might tend to
reduce any existing market disparities between interstate and
intrastate pipelines because, as a general rule, interstate pipelines' contracts are more likely to have indefinite escalation and
take-or-pay clauses than intrastate pipelines' contracts which are
more likely to have "market-out" clauses. 16
Another issue in this area is the ambiguity of FERC's legal
authority over contracts and specific contract terms. FERC has
no explicit general authority to modify gas purchase contracts or
to prescribe standards for those contracts. NGPA sections 313-15
do enumerate certain specific limitations on contracts and, under
section 5 of the NGA FERC has authority to modify contracts
found to be unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or
preferential. 170 While the Sierra-Mobile-Memphis doctrine discussed earlier purportedly limits FERC interference with contract terms, that doctrine itself is very fragile. For instance, the
Commission's current regulations prohibit the use of indefinite

because the producer has a lease obligation to avoid drainage of the leased acreage by
other wells producing around the lease. Take-or-pay clauses also prevent purchasers from
discriminating among producers, taking more gas from some, including affiliates of the
purchaser, while taking little or no gas from producers.
167 Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Producer/Purchaser Contracts
and Their Potential Impacts on the Natural Gas Market: An Analysis of the Natural Gas
Policy Act and Several Alternatives, Part II, at vii Uune, 1982).
168 NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 144-45.
16 Energy Information Administration, supra note 167, at xi.
170 The NGA applies to all gas, including old flowing gas, not specifically exempted
by the NGPA. Letter from Charles B. Curtis, Chairman of FERC, to Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, at 86 (Sept. 8, 1978) (accompanying section by section analysis of NGPA).
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escalator clauses in pre-NGPA interstate sales contracts.' 7' The
FERC adopted this prohibition prospectively in 1961, using its
authority under the NGA, on the grounds that such clauses are
"incompatible" with the public interest. 72 The Supreme Court
upheld this action. 73 The Court later specifically upheld retroactive and prospective restrictions on price escalation clauses in
area rate proceedings by limiting prices to those established by
the Commission, not by the parties' contracts. 74
In adopting the NGPA, Congress believed it necessary to
grant FERC specific statutory authority to restrict the operation
of indefinite price escalator clauses as they might be applied in
light of NGPA prices. 175 Clearly, Congress did not believe that
the NGA gave FERC the authority to restrict such clauses absent
additional statutory authority. Given Congress' specific statutory
action to allow certain discrete limitations on indefinite price
escalators, one must conclude that Congress did not intend to
grant broad authority to restrict contract clauses under any section of the NGPA, nor did Congress interpret the NGA as granting such authority.
The Commission's own precedent holds that FERC may not
regulate contract clauses covering gas which is not subject to its
jurisdiction.176 Once gas is deregulated under the NGPA, FERC
has no direct authority over the price paid for that gas and thus,
arguably, cannot -act to prohibit or proscribe contract terms affecting that gas. There is simply no definitive resolution of the ex171 18 C.F.R. § i54.93 (1981).
172 Order No. 232, 25 F.P.C. 379,380 (1961).
173 FPCv. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
174
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 783-84.
175
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3315(b)(3) & 3331(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
76
1 Cf. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., Docket No. RP73-65, 19 FPS 5-356
(1979); and predecessor cases, 59 F.P.C. 1259 (1977) and 58 F.P.C. 331 (1977). In those
cases, all involving the same factual situation, the Commission found it had no jurisdiction
over the gas in question; therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the contracts covering that
gas. The Commission overturned the administrative law judge's refusal to allow the pipe-

line cost passthrough on the grounds the contract contained escalator clauses which were
illegal under FERC regulations. The Commission noted it had no role in regulating those
contracts and the administrative law judges attempt to base his refusal of the passthrough
on the illegality of those contracts was invalid. The Commission did review the reasonableness of the pipeline's actions, including its entry into the questioned contracts, as part
of the Commission's jurisdiction over the pipeline.
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tent of FERC's authority over contracts and specific contract
terms. Clearly, any effort by FERC to abrogate contracts or specific contract terms will be tested in court.
The price fly-up debate has heretofore ignored the fact section 122, under which the President or Congress may re-impose
controls at any time between July 1, 1985, and June 30, 1987,
provides a significant mechanism to address the problem of the
"price spike" if it occurs. This authority also may operate as a
moderating influence on producer prices. The threat of possible
reimposition of controls in light of radically increased gas prices
may serve to restrict price increases or encourage contract renegotiation to limit the effect of price escalators by the private
parties to the contract. Given this significant stand-by authority,
the price spike issue becomes somewhat less urgent.

IV. FUruTRE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGES TO THE NGPA
At this point, whether changes in the NGPA will be made
and whether they will come from FERC's exercise of its administrative discretion or from Congress itself can only be speculation.
FERC, after proposing several rulemakings and notices of inquiries which would provide incentive prices for gas, appears not
to intend to take any further action to move the proposals along.
In Congress, hearings on NGPA's general status are being conducted. A variety of bills to amend the NGPA have been introduced, ranging from Representative Young's bill which would
place further regulations on natural gas and eliminate the 1985
date for natural gas decontrol, to Representative Gramm's and
Senator Johnston's bills which would accelerate deregulation.'77
Most of the bills probably will be reintroduced in the 98th Congress. Certainly, additional bills with yet more innovative approaches also will be submitted.
A.

FutureAdministrativeAction by FERC
FERC has received extensive comments on its notice of in-

.17 H.R. 4390 (Representative Gramm), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6850
(Representative Young), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2074 (Senator Johnston), 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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quiry regarding old flowing gas and on its other proposed rulemakings for incentive pricing. These comments urge widely different solutions to the perceived problems. These radically different approaches reflect the wide political divergence within the
nation. FERC has taken little action to date in response to these
comments. If, in fact, the Administration plans to introduce a
deregulation bill in the 98th Congress, it seems unlikely FERC
would confuse the issue by taking steps on its own to make administrative changes in natural gas pricing pursuant to its authorities under the NGPA. Although FERC is an independent
agency, the majority of its commissioners were appointed by the
current Administration and presumably are not inclined to compete with the Administration on changes in gas pricing. Moreover, the storm of publicity caused by the FERC's past proposals
for administrative action and its consequent deliberate action on
those proposals suggest that this collegial body is only too happy
to allow the Administration to step forward to propose new
solutions to the gas pricing problems.
Many of the gas producer groups which were expected to
submit detailed comments on the old flowing gas notice of inquiry, apparently anticipating little if any action on the NOI by
FERC, filed limited, if any, comments.178 This paucity of information makes it difficult for FERC to build a case to support administrative changes to the NGPA even if FERC were so inclined. Further, these limited responses give FERC an equally
limited data base upon which to support arguments to the Congress for changes in the NGPA.
B.

Action Within the Congress

With the extensive hearings held during 1982 by both the
Senate and House of Representatives,17 the 98th Congress has an

178 Extensive comments were submitted by a group of 28 producers. See Joint Comments of Indicated Producers, supra note 153. However, such traditional gas producer
groups as the Natural Gas Supply Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the In-

dependent Petroleum Association of America and various regional gas producer associations submitted no comments.
179 See note 139supra.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 71

initial basis for discussing some problems within the NGPA.
However, given the volatile nature of the economy, and hence
the energy markets, many of the facts presented during these
hearings might have changed significantly. Also, the structure of
the 98th Congress is somewhat different than that of the 97th.
Thus, in spite of the hearings held in 1982, those seeking to work
changes in the NGPA still have an uphill fight.
The leadership of the 97th Congress expressed doubts about
the willingness of the 98th Congress to address the NGPA issue
again. 1'0 If it does, the starting point for congressional consideration of amendments to the NGPA undoubtedly will be the Natural Gas Regulation Study prepared by the Congressional Research Service and the National Regulatory Research Institute.' 8
The report quite properly points out that the current system of
regulation and the inflexibility of the gas transportation system
have several institutional impacts, the most important of which
may be a tendency toward long term agreements. By contract
provisions, such as take-or-pay clauses and price escalator
clauses, the producers attempt to protect themselves.182 By regulation and rolled-in pricing, the consumer is protected. But the
results of these protections are that producers are, to some extent,
insulated by their contracts from market signals and consumers
are insulated by regulation from specific price negotiations and
the full economic cost of gas. These protections make impossible
any reasonable and effective negotiation for sale prices and conditions between producers and pipelines because the negotiations
do not reflect current market status. Therefore, as the study con-

180 Representative Philip Sharp (D.-Ind.), Chair of the relevant Subcommittee on
Fossil and Synthetic Fuels, in a June of 1982 speech before the Gas Men's Roundtable,
cautioned the membership that regardless of his own point of view, his informal feeling of
the rest of Congress was that there was no real need to open up the issue. He noted that
those wishing to make changes in the NGPA will have to convince a number of members
of the House in order to get the issue moving.
181 NATuRAL GAS REGULATION STuDY, supra note 3.
182 If price escalator clauses were not a factor or the impact of such clauses were
mitigated, the take-or-pay clauses would probably not be subject to this criticism because
such clauses not only provide market protection for the producer, but also serve a nonmarket function regulating cash flow and gas storage to compensate for the cyclical demand for natural gas.
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eludes, wellhead prices have little or no responsiveness to actual
market supply and demand. 1 3
In comparing regulatory alternatives, the study not only considers wellhead pricing deregulation but also goes a step further;
it examines the changes needed in regulation of the pipeline industry, given deregulation at the wellhead. The study lists as
goals for regulatory changes: 1) adequate and reliable natural gas
service; 2) economic efficiency; 3) equity among producers, pipelines and consumers; 4) assurance of financial stability of the
pipeline, and 5) adequate response to market and price signals
affecting the regulated system.'1 The study outlines four basic
options:
Remaining with conventional public utility regulation essentially the same as now in place; operating natural gas transmission systems without regulation; adopting a common carrier
status for the line; or devising a hybrid regulatory system possessing characteristics of both utility and common carrier regulation. 1'
Interestingly, the study itself contains relatively little discussion of the impact of gas price increases on consumers or the national economy. This fact will obviously be seen as a serious-flaw
by consumer interests and as a substantial attribute by producers. However, the absence of discussion may simply reflect a
steadily growing belief that the issue of natural gas pricing and
its impact on natural gas production reserves, and indeed the
energy needs of the country, can most profitably be discussed by
separating the issues of energy policy from those of domestic welfare policy, at least in attempting to draw rational pricing policies for energy development.1m Certainly no one can deny that
the impact of gas prices on that segment of society which simply
cannot afford increases in home heating or power prices must be
183 NATuRAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 5.

Id. at9.
Id. The study constructs an abstract of the goals and compares the various types
of regulation as to their ability to achieve such goals in table form. Id. at 11.
186 In one sense the economic impact of gas pricing on consumers is the basic issue in
the entire regulation of natural gas. Obviously, if price were no consideration whatsoever,
there would be no issue to discuss.
114
15
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addressed. However, there is a growing sentiment even among
consumers that it is inappropriate to base the overall pricing policy for natural gas upon the limited number of consumers who
cannot afford increased energy prices.'7
Bills introduced in the 98th Congress will cover the range of
options from price freezes and continued controls to immediate
deregulation. Proponents of expanded or continued regulation
argue that current gas prices are unaffordable. However, such
proponents are opposing a growing trend toward deregulation in
all areas. Conversely, parties agree it will be impossible to move
any accelerated decontrol legislation through Congress without
the vigorous support of the Administration. Given the Administration's past history on its support of such advance deregulation
and its failure to work actively for such legislation, the necessary
support may not be forthcoming.
Bills oriented toward accelerated deregulation will no doubt
be drafted to decontrol gradually increasing amounts of natural
gas. Deregulation bills may be drawn which in quick succession
release all gas in a given NGPA category from controls. Such bills
can emerge in a myriad of ways. Nonetheless, bills promoting deregulation will probably impose an ultimate price cap for natural gas tied to some commodity such as crude oil.
Along with the introduction of any accelerated decontrol legislation, a bill proposing a so-called "windfall profit" tax also
should be expected. Even deregulation proponents have acknowledged such a tax may well be a quid pro quo. With the
prospect of large federal deficits, the revenue from such a tax
must be most appealing to both Congress and the Administration. Basically, such a tax would take the form of a straight excise
or severance tax or a "windfall profit tax" such as is applied to

1

87 For

a lengthy discussion of this idea, see COMMITTEE

FOR ECONOMIC DEvELoP-

MENT, ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY (July 1982), which argues that while the poor

need protection against the effects of higher energy prices, energy pricing cannot be bound
to welfare issues. It also argues that the government needs to address both income assistance and efficient energy pricing issues without attempting to mix the policy instruments
appropriate to each of those issues. In these days of reductions in government spending on
all fronts, but particularly for welfare assistance, it is unrealistic to argue that government
assistance will come forward to insulate the poor against the increase in energy costs.
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crude oil.'s8 Such a windfall profit tax applies a certain percentage tax to the difference between a set base price, usually escalated for inflation, and the actual sale price of the commodity.
Different percentage rates are applied to different commodity
categories; thus, the new gas category difference might be taxed
at the rate of twenty percent, old gas at the rate of forty percent,
etc.
Bills limiting the operation of contract clauses also can be expected. Such legislation would probably grant FERC the authority to proscribe take-or-pay clauses and price escalators in contracts applying to "deregulated" gas in order to make gas prices
more responsive to market demand. Again, such bills may well
be viewed as a quid pro quo for accelerated deregulation. Congressional hearings and public comments to FERC have revealed
increasing sentiment for such bills among pipelines and consumers. Such bills may be adopted regardless of actions on price

controls.
Unfortunately, commentators tend to group the indefinite
price escalators and take-or-pay clauses in the same discussion.
Such clauses must be considered separately because take-or-pay
clauses, while serving the economic purpose of producer protection, also serve critical non-economic interests of both the pipeline and the producer. Take-or-pay clauses are an attempt to regulate cash flow and deliveries in light of the cyclical demand for
natural gas. Any restriction on their legality must recognize this
non-economic function as well as the producer's exposure to legal
challenge.
In any action taken to address the problems of gas pricing
and distribution, Congress must continually consider the impact
of its actions on all parts of society. Congress does not enjoy the
luxury of the interest groups which need consider only the single
interest of their members. Therefore, Congress, in taking action,
must consider not only the impact on gas production, gas reserves
and all energy needs, but also the ultimate impact on an already
shaky economy. Considering these competing interests, it is easy
to see why Congress becomes embroiled in such lengthy, complex
188

(1980).

See The Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229
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and bitter disputes when it begins to address the issue of gas pricing.
C. Action Within the PrivateSector
Given the uncertainty in the treatment of gas pricing, the industry (both producers and pipelines or other purchasers) appears to be remarkably innovative in its attempts to deal with uncertainty. Pipelines particularly have been innovative in providing "market out" triggers to make the prices they pay for natural
gas more responsive to their markets. New gas contracts increasingly contain such market out clauses. For instance, fifty-four
percent of the contracts written in 1980 containing deregulation
clauses also included "market out" clauses and forty-six percent
of those contracts included maximum price provisions. 8 9 These
clauses have various triggers, some of which are based upon the
cost of alternate fuels in different market areas. Thus, at least in
new contracts, purchasers appear to be taking steps to protect
themselves absent regulations. The typical free market response
already is beginning to be felt in contracts for that section 107 gas
which is now deregulated. These contracts contain market out
clauses which are now being exercised.
Producers also are considering ways to protect their interests
through use of stepped price clauses which begin at a somewhat
lower contract price. In addition, producers are using sliding
take-or-pay clauses. Other clauses provide if a purchaser exercises a market out clause, the producer can lawfully terminate
the contract and require the purchaser to transport the gas if the
producer can locate an alternate purchaser. Producers also are
seeking indemnification clauses if they are challenged by interest
owners for actions taken by the purchaser.
For those supplies of gas subject to existing contracts, the options are more limited. These contracts are subject to renegotiation, which, at this stage, is fraught with uncertainties. Yet it
is possible that both purchaser and seller might be able to undertake a more mutually beneficial renegotiation in the calmer times

189

Energy Information Administration, supra note 167.
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before deregulation. Certain major pipelines are approaching
their suppliers and requesting major renegotiations of contracts,
especially regarding take-or-pay liabilities. Realistically, if the
producer's price at the wellhead, plus the addition of the pipeline's costs, exceeds the market clearing prices at which the pipeline can resell the gas, the producer will have an incentive to renegotiate a lower price in return for greater sale quantities.' l®
First, to the extent high prices threaten the economic viability of
the pipeline, the producer has an interest in maintaining the
pipeline as a purchaser. Second, the producer might have additional new supplies to sell to the same pipeline which could not
otherwise be sold absent mutual agreement of the parties. 191
Most important, in some instances the pipeline itself has considerable retaliatory power based upon the state law calculation
of allowable production. In Texas, for instance, production allowables for ratable takes by pipelines from producers .are calculated not only on the basis of the producer's estimate of how
much gas can be produced over the next month, but also upon
the basis of estimates submitted by the purchaser of how much
gas the purchaser will need. 92 The pipeline can submit its estimates for only those purchases which it knows it can resell. Thus,
the state can set the allowable production based upon the purchaser's estimate of need, rather than upon the producer's estimate of production. This will establish the lawfully permissible
production rate from the producer's well.
The pipeline then may rely upon the "take-or-pay clause,"
which requires it to take or pay for only that quantity of production "lawfully produced" from the well. Since the amount that
can be lawfully produced is determined by estimates made by the
pipeline, any amount of gas produced in excess of that amount is

10 Some market out clauses may be triggered by a pipeline if the pipelines total gas
cost, including the pipeline's costs, exceeds certain prices in the pipeline's marketing areas.
Thus, the price paid to one producer may not be as high as the price paid by the pipeline to

other producers or its own affiliates, but the pipeline could exercise at its sole discretion the
market out clause in the contract with the producer who was paid less.
191 Pierce, NaturalGasRegulation, Deregulation,and Contracts,68 VA. L. REv. 63,
103(1982).

192 Texas Railroad Commission Rule 051.01.99.001, adopted by Special Order File

No. 20-68,382.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

unlawfully produced and the pipeline is not obligated to take or
pay for that amount. Most state conservation laws are based
upon conservation and efficient production of the gas. 13If the
pipelines estimate they cannot resell the gas, then the well's production in spite of the lack of market would violate the state
agency's mandates to conserve resources. If the state agency
chooses to set production allowables based upon the purchasers
estimates, the impact of take-or-pay clauses could be considerably reduced.
Assuming deregulation occurs as scheduled by the NGPA,
disputes regarding gas sales will be bound by state laws governing private contracts. With the demise of regulation, contractual
provisions will become more and more important. It is imperative for producers and pipelines to renegotiate carefully old contracts and to give thorough deliberation to new gas contracts.
The days of relying upon a standard form gas contract, safe in
the knowledge that for all practical purposes the contractual provisions are often superseded by regulations, are long past. Wise
legal counsel suggests review of existing contracts and possible renegotiation, if necessary, now rather than in 1985. Likewise,
new contracts should be drawn with contingencies for scheduled
deregulation, as well as accelerated or no deregulation and reregulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The next two years will be times of great uncertainty in the
natural gas industry. It is likely that legislative changes will be
made during that time, but specific legislation cannot be anticipated now. However, certain basic problems which will surface in some form have been identified. It is imperative that all
interested parties participate in the entire process and that careful analysis be provided to Congress and FERC, as well as the industry.
Even if the NGPA is not changed, the effect of the scheduled
deregulation of new gas categories is largely unknown. Adminis193 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:41 (West 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 238
(West 1969); TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 85055 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1981).
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trative action may accelerate slightly under those circumstances,
but the bulk of effort will fall on the entire industry. Creativity in
considering the problems faced by each segment of the industry
will be mandatory. Some pipelines are, even today, working
better with producers than they have in the past. But producerpipeline cooperation alone will be insufficient to resolve the
major potential and actual issues of disparity in gas acquisition,
price spike or fly-up, and market disorder. Each of these issues
has its own complications and a plethora of related issues, all affected by external variables such as the economy and foreign policy. The resolution of these issues inevitably will be gradual and
painful.

